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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
 
Foreign investment was believed to have been fostered by states signing 
bilateral investment treaties (BITS) and multilateral investment treaties as a 
way of protecting investors. The proliferation of such agreements has been 
exponential over the past century.1 Unlike trade, the regulation of investment 
is largely fragmented as no comprehensive multilateral accord exists. 
International investment flows are protected by a disintegrated system of 
approximately 3328 international investment agreements (IIAs) and 300 free 
trade agreements (FTAs) with investment chapters.2 These agreements 
include binding provisions on the standards of protection for the foreign 
investors, such as national treatment, fair and equitable treatment, and 
liberal repatriation of funds. The most fundamental feature of IIAs is that 
investors can assert their rights against host counties directly before 
transnational arbitration tribunals.3 
The convergence of trade and investment law has led to the gradual 
progression of the international investment dispute settlement system.4 This 
is even more so, because of the onset of investment chapters in trade 
agreements. However, the issues arising from the current investment dispute 
settlement regime have caused a lag in the signing of major trade agreements. 
These issues are not new but they have been brought to the fore because of 
the merging of trade and investment in one agreement. 5 
                                                          
1 Wegen G ‘Dispute settlement and arbitration’ (1985) 59 Transitional Legal Policy 59 66. 
2 Berger A ‘Do We Really Need a Multilateral Investment Agreement?’ (2013) German Development Institute 3; 
World Investment Report – UNCTAD (2017) 111. 
3Anders A ‘The world needs a multilateral investment agreement’ Peterson Institute for International Economics. 
4Alford RP ‘The convergence of international trade and investment arbitration’ (2013) Scholarly Works. Research 
1072 38. 
5 Alford RP ‘The convergence of international trade and investment arbitration’ (2013) Scholarly Works. Research 
1072 38 
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The dispute settlement system flows in one way as only the investor is granted 
rights to institute a claim against the host state should they breach any clause 
contained in the treaty.6 These IIAs do not extend the same right to institute 
claims for host states. It was largely believed that the essence of the 
investment protection for any host state was economic development, which 
consisted of huge concessions made by the state to its sovereignty.7  
 
The settlement of international investment disputes has largely been 
regulated by treaties and contracts. There are three crucial clauses contained 
in BITs that set the course for the resolution of an international investment 
dispute. These clauses are the dispute settlement clause which would pertain 
to the interpretation of the treaty and most likely call for compulsory 
arbitration. The second clause provides for dispute settlement machinery, 
which laws would be applied.8 Finally a clause that is controversial and aptly 
termed the ‘umbrella clause’, which obliges the state to observe certain terms 
towards the investor. The interpretation of these clauses has proved to be very 
contentious and this inordinately led to a rise in the number of investment 
disputes.9 
 
 
The investment dispute settlement system has always been segmented with 
the minimum international standards being interpreted and applied 
differently in various jurisdictions.10 Traditionally investment disputes were 
within the jurisdiction of domestic courts. Before the onset of the current 
investor state dispute settlement (ISDS) system in the mid-twentieth century, 
                                                          
6 Sornarajah M’ The International Law on Foreign Investment’ 3ed (2010) 276. 
7 Sornarajah M’ The International Law on Foreign Investment’ 3ed (2010) 313. 
8 Wegen G ‘Dispute settlement and arbitration’ (1985) 59 Transitional Legal Policy 59 67. 
9 Berger A ‘Do We Really Need a Multilateral Investment Agreement?’ (2013) German Development Institute. 
10 Anders A ‘The world needs a multilateral investment agreement’ Peterson Institute for International 
Economics; Berger A ‘Do We Really Need a Multilateral Investment Agreement?’ (2013)  German Development 
Institute. 
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investment disputes that failed to be resolved through diplomatic dialogue or 
through the municipal court system remained unsettled.11 The alternative 
which was largely untenable was that the investor would have to seek 
intervention from their home state through espousal of the claim. The 
investor’s home state would then bring the claim to the host state through 
diplomacy or threat of use of force.12 These methods left investors mostly 
unprotected because of the perceived lack of impartiality of municipal courts 
and the injured investor’s home state that was under no obligation to espouse 
the claim.13  
 
The main problem with investment is there is no overarching set of rules.14 
The issue that developing countries mainly, African developing countries 
have, is that the current investment regime was formulated by developed 
countries.15 Concomitantly the investment dispute resolution is found within 
this fragmented westernized investment law regime. During the period after 
World War 1, investment disputes were referred for arbitration as use of force 
was no longer permitted.16 In 1965, a convention on the settlement of 
investment disputes between states and foreign investors was concluded. This 
resulted in the establishment of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), an international arbitration institution for the 
settlement of international investment disputes. This was spearheaded by the 
World Bank with a system which was designed specifically for investment 
disputes, as will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 2.17 Not all countries 
                                                          
11 Sornarajah M’ The International Law on Foreign Investment’ 3ed (2010) 21. 
12 Johnson OT & Gimblett T. "From Gunboats to BITs: The Evolution of Modern International Investment Law," 
(2011) Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 657. 
13 Sornarajah M’ The International Law on Foreign Investment’ 3ed (2010) 320. 
14 Sauvant K ‘The evolving international investment law and policy regime: Ways forward. Available at 
http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15_no14_Investment_final_REV_x1.pdf (Accessed 27 
November 2016). 
15 Sauvant K ‘the regulatory framework for investment: where are we headed?’ (2011) Research in Global 
Strategic Management, Volume 15, 413. 
16 Johnson OT & Gimblett T. "From Gunboats to BITs: The Evolution of Modern International Investment Law," 
(2011) Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 659. 
17Schreuer C ‘The World Bank/ICSID Dispute Settlement Procedures’ available at 
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/66_icsid.pdf  (accessed 29 March 2017). 
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are parties to ICSID and even those that are members can agree to oust the 
jurisdiction of the ICSID tribunal.18 Investment as a result is largely regulated 
by IIAs and agreements between private investors and governments. The 
dispute settlement method is chosen by the parties to the agreement. This 
further exacerbates the problems with the investment dispute settlement 
system as parties are free to choose institutional arbitration or ad hoc 
arbitration. This results in a lack of consistency, with the majority of awards 
being handed down by independent and differently constituted tribunals.19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 Scheuer C ‘Investment treaty arbitration and jurisdiction over contract claims – the Vivendi I case considered’ 
in Weiler T (ed.) International investment law and arbitration: leading cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, bilateral 
treaties and customary international law (2005) 294. 
19 Nilsson A & Engelsson O ‘Inconsistent award in investment treaty arbitration; is an appeals court needed? 
Journal of International arbitration (2013) 565. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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1.2. RESEARCH PROBLEM  
 
The main question to be answered in this research is whether the current 
foreign investment dispute settlement system is legitimate enough to address 
the developmental issues faced by African countries. Is the current foreign 
investment dispute settlement system inclusive of the unique issues faced by 
African governments which are often found on the receiving end of huge 
damages claims? A comprehensive study of the current international 
investment dispute settlement regime is required to address these issues. A 
follow up question would be whether the foreign investment dispute 
settlement system was designed with African nations as host states in mind. 
What are the current issues being faced by the foreign investment dispute 
settlement system?  What improvements can be made? How can these 
improvements be made in the African context? 
 
1.2.1.Research objectives and aims  
The research seeks to review the existing foreign investment dispute 
settlement system. The issues that have already been highlighted by several 
scholars and the rampant call for reform in investment dispute settlement will 
be examined. Lessons will be drawn from the current foreign investment 
dispute settlement system with special attention being paid to the tribunal 
set up by the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between 
Canada and Europe. The main aim of the research is to present an analysis 
of the current investment dispute settlement regime, with particular focus on 
the issues faced by African countries. The mini thesis will conclude with 
proposals for reform in the investment dispute settlement regime, specifically 
by capacitating existing arbitral institutions in Africa and eventually creating 
an African Regional investment dispute settlement system housed within the 
Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA). The research will conclude with 
proposals for the incorporation of investment chapters in the Tripartite Free 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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Trade Area (TFTA) and CFTA and the structure of an investment dispute 
settlement system for the African region.  
 
The research objective is broken down into the following aims: 
i. To provide an assessment of the current international 
investment dispute settlement system in the African 
context. 
ii. To identify and analyse the issues faced within the current 
investment dispute system. 
iii. To critically analyse the solutions that have been proffered 
for the current investment dispute settlement system and 
whether these can be applied on the African continent. 
iv. To propose suggestions for an African Regional investment 
court. 
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1.3. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM 
 
The legal basis of the current investment dispute settlement regime is very 
multiplex, while many of the other international law dispute settlement 
mechanisms are anchored in well-defined treaty frameworks. Investment 
dispute settlement is spread across dispute resolution provisions contained 
in over 3000 IIAs, in other international conventions notably the ICSID 
Convention, the New York Convention and arbitration rules.20 
 
The call for reform in the investment dispute settlement system has largely 
been about the far-reaching implications of ISDS.21 This is the most 
prominent issue amongst a myriad of issues. There are also issues to do with 
the contradictions between arbitral awards leading to inconsistent 
interpretation of investment protection standards and unpredictability of 
decisions.22 The difficulties arising from these issues are that they not only 
apply on a global level but also regionally as each continent has different 
development agendas. There has been an increase in the number of cases 
involving ISDS.23 These investment disputes have generated strong debate 
amongst stake holders as the policy implications are far reaching as they 
encompass areas such as environment or public health.24 This is even more 
concerning for African states as most countries are recipients of foreign direct 
investment. The crux of the current investment regime is protection of 
investments, this was the original design, and the system is rigged in favour 
of investors.25 This is where the issues arise as African states have 
                                                          
20 Gaukrodger, D & Gordon K “Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy 
Community”, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, (2013) . 
21 Carim X ‘International investment agreements and Africa’s structural transformation: A perspective from 
South Africa’ South Centre Investment Policy Brief, Issue No 4 (August 2015) 5. 
22 Sornarajah M’ The International Law on Foreign Investment’ 3ed (2010) 320. 
23 Laborde G ‘The Case for Host State Claims in Investment Arbitration’ Journal of international dispute 
settlement 97. 
24 Berger A ‘Do We Really Need a Multilateral Investment Agreement?’ (2013) German Development Institute. 
25 Mann H ‘Reconceptualising international investment law: its role in sustainable development’ Lewis & Clarke 
Law Review Vol 17 (2013) 534. 
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development considerations while trying to balance the flow of investments. 
Over 95 governments have faced challenges under ISDS of which 60 per cent 
were developing countries. In the African context 25 per cent of all reported 
investment disputes involve extractive industries which are vital for the 
development of African economies. 26 
 
Among the issues faced in the current investment dispute settlement regime 
is the independence of arbitrators, the time it takes for a matter to conclude 
and the cost of proceedings.27 This mini-thesis contributes to the current 
debate on the legitimacy of the investment dispute settlement issues by 
considering the numerous developmental problems faced by African 
governments in the face of huge damage claims. When they face investment 
disputes and they have damages claims awarded against them, it is not an 
ideal situation. Foreign investment disputes are fundamentally about the 
right of governments to change policy in the face of an agreement that binds 
them not to do so. There are other factors that need to be considered when 
granting awards which cannot be done by a panel of arbitrators that most 
likely would have been selected from an international law firm with no 
inclination of the development issues faced by such governments. The 
suggestions to be made are the establishment of a regional court on the 
African continent which would be easier to establish because regional trade 
agreements are generally easier to negotiate than attempting to establish an 
international permanent court of investment. The tribunal established by 
CETA will serve as a prime example of how a regional court can be established 
and housed in the framework of the CFTA which is still being negotiated.28 
 
                                                          
26 Carim X ‘International investment agreements and Africa’s structural transformation: A perspective from 
South Africa’ South Centre Investment Policy Brief, Issue No 4 (August 2015) 6.  
27 Köppen A & d’Aspremont J, Global Reform vs Regional Emancipation: The Principles on International 
Investment for Sustainable Development in Africa, 6:2 ESIL Reflection. 
28 European Commission- A future multilateral investment court, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-16-4350_en.htm (accessed 20 December 2016). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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1.4. METHODOLOGY 
 
The research will be a desktop study, as the research will be largely based on 
library research and internet sources. Primary resources will include the book 
by Sornarajah ‘The International Law on Foreign Investment’, the Investment 
chapter in CETA, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) Investment Code and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Finance and Investment Protocol (FIP). The CETA 
Tribunal provides a good comparator because it is housed in a trade 
agreement with an investment chapter, in a similar manner to the proposals 
made for the housing of the African tribunal in the CFTA. Secondary sources 
will include journal articles, internet sources, position researches and other 
scholarly material. 
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1.5. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
1.5.1.Chapter One 
 
This is the introduction which has provided the background to the problem 
and research problem. It also included research objectives, research aims, 
significance of the problem, the methodology adopted by the paper and the 
outline of the chapters. 
 
1.5.2.Chapter Two  
The history of the investment dispute system and its origins. It is important 
to understand the context wherein the customary international law was 
fashioned and where it originated. It will also examine how these practices 
were implemented on the African continent. It will analyse the organisations 
which house investment disputes, particularly the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which was formed for the sole 
purpose of settling investment disputes.   
 
 
1.5.3.Chapter Three  
This will provide an analysis of the current investment dispute settlement 
system and the issues that it faces will be provided. The proposed solutions 
to investment disputes will be examined regarding the CETA and whether it 
offers the ultimate solution which can be implemented on the African 
continent. The new approach to investment protection that is introduced by 
CETA shows a clear break from the investor state dispute settlement.  
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
23 
 
1.5.4.Chapter Four  
This will examine the current investment dispute settlement mechanisms in 
Africa and the existing legal framework such as the SADC FIP, Pan African 
Investment Code together with a critique of the COMESA Investment Dispute 
Settlement system.  
 
1.5.5.Chapter Five 
This will be a conclusion with suggestions for the gradual implementation of 
a regional court of investment firstly through the TFTA then the CFTA. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter will examine the history of international investment law as a 
whole, where the law originated from and how the dispute settlement system 
came about. It is prudent to provide an overview of the complete history of 
international investment law as the international investment dispute 
settlement system was created within its context, and largely as a result of 
different norms. The political context in which the international investment 
regime was formulated has shaped the resultant rules fundamentally. These 
principles still resonate within the modern principles, structures, agreements 
and dispute resolution system.29  
 
The foundations of international law and the resultant international 
investment law as it is understood currently lie firmly in the development of 
western culture and political organisation.30 Due to the growth of European 
notions of sovereignty, the independent nations required an acceptable 
method whereby relations between states could be conducted in accordance 
with commonly accepted standards of behaviour, and international law filled 
the gap.31 The consequent evolution of the international investment law 
regime was a process whereby one view, mainly the European imperialist, one 
became entrenched. The capital exporting nations were solely concerned with 
the protection of investment.32 This brings to the fore the settlement of 
                                                          
29 Sornarajah M’ The International Law on Foreign Investment’ 3ed (2010) 21; Miles K ‘The origins of international 
investment law: empire, environment and the safeguarding of capital’ (2013)3. 
30 Shaw MN ‘International Law’ 5ed (2003) 13. 
31 Shaw MN ‘International Law’ 5ed (2003) 13. 
32 Miles K ‘The origins of international investment law: empire, environment and the safeguarding of capital’ 
(2013) 7. 
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investment disputes. Wherein again the regime created was based on notions 
and ideologies of Western nations. Developing countries have long been eager 
to reduce what they regard as the privileges accorded to capitalist states by 
international law and international investment law. Developing countries lay 
great emphasis upon the sovereignty and independence of states and resent 
the economic influence of the West. The Western nations, on the other hand, 
have wished to protect their investments and nationals abroad and provide 
for the security of their property.33 
 
The historical evolution of international investment law needs to be 
thoroughly investigated as the repercussions of the system have greatly 
influenced the current status quo.34 The origins of the international 
investment system and dispute settlement will inform the current issues faced 
in these systems. 
 
The chapter is divided into four parts, the history of international investment 
law, the history of international investment disputes, the history of 
international investment disputes in Africa and the legal framework of 
investment dispute settlement. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 Shaw MN ‘International Law’ 5ed (2003) 733. Any significant growth in the number of unresolved investment 
disputes could be highly detrimental to the future of FDI flows throughout the world, and such disputes could 
also cause strains in diplomatic relations between governments. As a consequence, investment dispute 
settlement procedures will take on greater importance, and the existing system of institutional arrangements 
will be under much more detailed and critical scrutiny. 
34 Miles K ‘The origins of international investment law: empire, environment and the safeguarding of capital’ 
(2013) 7. 
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2.2. THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
2.2.1. The Pre- Colonial Period 
 
International investment law originated from European nations as they 
transformed their regional policies to protect property into international 
investment law applicable to property owned in their previous trading 
partners.35 Fundamental to the protection of foreign investment is the concept 
of property.36 An international minimum standard for the treatment of aliens 
and their property was developed as part of international customary law. This 
entailed a higher standard of protection than that available to the locals of the 
host state. 
The Latin nations believed that aliens should be given equal treatment with 
nationals. The development of this approach was based on the increasing 
resentment of the domination of Western states. The Latin American states 
felt, in particular, that the international minimum standard concept had been 
used as a means of interfering in their internal affairs. Accordingly, the Calvo 
doctrine was formulated. This was a reiteration of the principle of non-
intervention together with the assertion that foreign investors were entitled 
only to the same rights as the nationals of the host nation.37  
 
 
                                                          
35 Miles K ‘The origins of international investment law: empire, environment and the safeguarding of capital’ 
(2013) 7. 
36 M Sornarajah The Clash of Globalisations and the International Law on Foreign Investment The Simon Reisman 
Lecture in International Trade Policy 8. The hegemonic power seeks to universalise the concept of property that 
it favours through the instrumentality of international law. There is a clear project to foster onto the 
international regime, as the centrepiece of foreign investment protection, a theory of absolute protection of 
foreign investment that sits uneasily with the constitutional systems that are recognised in the different parts 
of the world. 
37 Sornarajah M’ The International Law on Foreign Investment’ 3ed  (2010) 19; The Calvo Doctrine was 
incorporated into agreements between Central and South American countries and advanced on occasion in 
diplomatic correspondence with the United States and European countries From gunboats  
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The alternative view required that aliens be treated in accordance with 
customary international law, which was inordinately higher than the national 
standard. This was called the Hull doctrine, it stated that when foreign 
property was expropriated the injured investor was entitled to prompt, 
adequate, and effective compensation.38 This was motivated by the developed 
nation’s concern that the standards of treatment provided to nationals in a 
host state may be low and therefore unacceptable.39 Nationals had to seek 
redress for grievances exclusively in the domestic arena40 
 
Both these views were based on the idea that the law should be designed to 
further the free movement of trade and investments across state boundaries.41 
However the Latin American states were generally too weak during this period 
to withstand the demands of the Western powers that injuries to foreign 
nationals be remedied according to the Western conception of international 
law.42 The Hull – rule thus prevailed and was taken up in later IIAs. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38Hackworth G, Digest of international law, Vol. 3,659; This requirement of full compensation for expropriation 
was most clearly articulated in the 1930s when it was challenged by the government of Mexico. Mexico 
confiscated various properties between 1915 and 1940.The United States, whose nationals suffered from these 
acts of expropriation, sought compensation for its affected citizens. In response to the takings by Mexico, the 
American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, put forth what has become the leading formulation of the full 
compensation standard. 
39Sornarajah M’ The International Law on Foreign Investment’ 3ed (2010) 19; The developed states of the West 
have argued historically that there exists an 'international minimum standard' for the protection of foreign 
nationals that must be upheld irrespective of how the state treats its own nationals, whereas other states 
maintained that all the state need do is treat the alien as it does its own nationals (the 'national treatment 
standard'). 
40 Shaw MN ‘International Law’ 5ed (2003) 734. 
41 Sornarajah M’ The International Law on Foreign Investment’ 3ed (2010) 19. 
42Johnson OT & Gimblett T. "From Gunboats to BITs: The Evolution of Modern International Investment Law," 
(2011) Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 657. 
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2.2.2. The Colonial Period 
 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, investment largely took place in 
the context of colonial expansion. These investments did not need specific 
protection as the colonial legal systems were integrated with those of the 
imperial powers. The imperial system gave sufficient protection to the 
investments which went into the colonies 43 One aspect of this protection was 
to ensure that colonial legal systems were changed in order to accommodate 
European notions of individual rights of property and freedom of contract. The 
power to lobby for laws that protected foreign owned property would have been 
enormous as it was the major trading companies which had first established 
colonial power in the states that were later integrated into the imperial 
system.44 
 
The imperial system ensured the protection of the investment within the 
system, there was no need for the growth of a separate system of law for the 
protection of foreign investments.45 Where investments  were made in areas 
which remained outside of the imperial system, territories were established 
into which the jurisdiction of the state did not extend,   so that trade and 
investment could be facilitated.46The United States of America (USA) began to 
conclude bilateral treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCNs), 
the purpose of which was to establish trade relations with its treaty partners. 
These treaties had provisions guaranteeing absolute protection of property. 
They also required payment of compensation for expropriation and 
guaranteed most favoured nation and national treatment with respect to the 
right to engage in certain business activities in the territory of the other party. 
                                                          
43 Sornarajah M’ The International Law on Foreign Investment’ 3ed (2010) 19. ‘Power was the final arbiter of 
foreign investment disputes in this early period. The use of force to settle investment disputes outside the 
colonial context was a frequent occurrence.’ Johnson OT & Gimblett T. "From Gunboats to BITs: The Evolution 
of Modern International Investment Law," (2011) Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 657. 
44 Sornarajah M’ The International Law on Foreign Investment’ 3ed (2010) 20. 
45 Sornarajah M’ The International Law on Foreign Investment’ 3ed (2010) 20. 
46 Sornarajah M’ The International Law on Foreign Investment’ 3ed (2010) 19. 
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Occasionally, they even provided limited protection for repatriation of funds. 
It is clear that the main focus was on establishing commercial relations and 
protecting property, as opposed to investment.47 The FCNs were limited in 
scope and the protection afforded was weak, because there was no means of 
enforcement. Therefore, a blend of diplomacy and force were the primary 
means of protecting investment.48  
 
During the nineteenth century the western economies began to expand 
rapidly, this caused heavy capital outflow especially towards the developing 
countries.49 This resulted in substantial areas of developing economies falling 
within the ownership and control of western corporations.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47 Vandevelde  K. ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ International Law and Policy 160. 
48 Vandevelde  K. ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ International Law and Policy 161. 
49 Shaw & Malcolm ‘International Law’ 5ed (2008) 738. 
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2.2.3. The Post-Colonial Period 
 
The post-colonial era began with the end of the second world war and 
continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union.50 The use of force to coerce 
the settlement of disputes continued even after the Second World War and 
into the post-colonial period. Capital exporting countries, which operated 
outside the colonial context which provided inherent protection, were keen to 
devise legal justification for pursuing the claims of their nationals and for the 
use of force if such use became necessary.51This was the advent of IIAs as we 
now know them. There were three specific events that shaped the structure 
and content of IIAs during that period.52 
 
To begin with, there was a reaction to the severe economic depression that 
had preceded the war as a result of the protectionist policies of the 
1920s.53This is what is believed to have led the consensus in 1947 to the 
conclusion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT'), which 
resulted in a multilateral agreement. This shift of trade agreements from 
bilateral to multilateral set in motion consecutive rounds of negotiations 
aimed at worldwide trade liberalisation.54 A separate treaty, the Havana 
Charter, which was intended to create the International Trade Organisation, 
which would have included some investment never entered in to force.55 
Therefore, entry into force of the GATT created a major multilateral 
organization with competence over trade, but not investment. Investment 
                                                          
50 Sornarajah M’ The International Law on Foreign Investment’ 3ed (2010) 20. 
51 Sornarajah M’ The International Law on Foreign Investment’ 3ed (2010) 20. 
52 Vandevelde  K. ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ International Law and Policy 160; 
53Vandevelde  K ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ International Law and Policy 161; 
International investment law as late as the period immediately following the Second World War has been 
characterized as "an ephemeral structure consisting largely of scattered treaty provisions, a few questionable 
customs, and contested general principles of law." Salacuse J &. Sullivan N, Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation 
of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, Harvard International Law .Journal. 67, 68. 
54 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 1947.  
55 Ellsworth PT ‘The Havana Charter: Comment’ The American Economic Review Vol. 39, No. 6. 1270. 
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would need to be treated outside the GATT framework, which to a large extent 
meant separately from trade.56 
This prompted the post-war FCNs which included some innovations. They 
extended protection in treaties from individuals to corporate entities, as 
earlier agreements had protected individuals only.57 In essence, the current 
treaty-based protection of investment that reflects the Euro-American 
consensus is nothing new. What these post war FCNs introduced was the 
inception of the dispute resolution provisions in what would later be BITs.58 
These agreements not only included a dispute resolution provision but they 
also contained a clause consenting to the jurisdiction of the international 
court of justice (ICJ) over disputes involving the interpretation or application 
of the agreement.59 This inclusion of a dispute resolution provision seemingly 
solved the problem that a host state could not be subject to the jurisdiction 
of an international tribunal without its consent. Foreign investors still needed 
to exhaust local remedies, however to persuade their home state to espouse 
their claim before pursuing a remedy under the ICJ.60  
 
The succeeding major event that shaped the international investment regime 
of the post-colonial period was the process of decolonisation that began after 
the war. This led to the creation of a great deal of newly independent but 
economically undeveloped countries.61 These developing states were viciously 
defensive of their independence and regarded foreign investment as a form of 
neo-colonialism because it involved foreign control over the means of 
                                                          
56 Vandevelde  K. ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ International Law and Policy 161. 
57 Walker H ‘Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,’ Minnesota Law Review 42. 
58 Johnson OT & Gimblett T. "From Gunboats to BITs: The Evolution of Modern International Investment Law," 
(2011) Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 
59 Vandevelde  K. ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ International Law and Policy 164; 
Salacuse J ‘Towards a New Treaty Framework for Direct Foreign Investment ’Journal of Air Law and Commerce. 
60 Vandevelde  K. ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ International Law and Policy 165. 
61 Rubins & Kinsella International investment, political risk and dispute resolution. A practitioner’s guide (2005) 
159. 
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production.62 Many developing countries closed their economies to new 
foreign investment and began to expropriate existing investment. Amidst the 
radical economic and political transformation these developing countries 
would seek to form agreements with other developing countries where 
needed.63 However, when various developing countries gained independence, 
they began to be influenced by the nationalisation measures taken by the 
Soviet Union after the success of the communist revolution. Foreign owned 
properties were under threat of expropriation in these developing countries 
due to this influence and call for nationalisation.64 
 
Therefore, the third event that shaped the investment law regime was the 
emergence of the socialist bloc led by the Soviet Union.65 Immediately after 
the war, the communist states commenced substantial expropriations 
including foreign-owned assets. While doing this, they also encouraged 
developing nations to also do the same as they viewed economic relations with 
the developed countries as exploitative. The communist nations advocated for 
state regulation as the best path to economic development rather than 
liberalisation of the market as advanced by western nations.66 
 
In 1974, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration of the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO), which stated that nations have "full 
permanent sovereignty" over their natural resources and other economic 
                                                          
62 Vandevelde  K. ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ International Law and Policy 166; 
Salacuse J &. Sullivan N, Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand 
Bargain, Harvard International Law .Journal 74-75. 
63 Rubins & Kinsella International investment, political risk and dispute resolution. A practitioner’s guide (2005) 
160. 
64 Shaw MN ‘ International Law’ 5ed ( 2008) 738 
65 Vandevelde  K. ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ International Law and Policy 167. 
66 Vandevelde  K. ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ International Law and Policy 168; 
What was articulated by the developing states was a set of rules that was highly sovereignty-centred and 
emphasised the right of the newly independent developing states to restructure their economies. This, they 
sought to accomplish through nationalisation of foreign property, unhindered by rules of international law that 
emphasised sanctity of contract and property and required the payment of the full value of the property as 
compensation—a requirement that newly independent countries could hardly meet.’ 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
33 
 
activities.67 This eventually led to the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
of States (CERDS) in 1974. The Charter stated that expropriation was allowed 
for nationalisation and that compensation could be paid, not that it must be 
paid, and that the amount of compensation would be based on municipal law, 
rather than international law.68 This seemed to restate the Calvo doctrine, 
quit befitting since the Mexican President had introduced the motion.69 
 
This prompted a response from the developed nations against the threat of 
uncompensated expropriation through proliferation of BITs.70 Despite the fact 
that the first BIT had been signed in 1959, they had not gained popularity 
until this period.71  These new BITs were remarkably uniform in content and 
contained several distinctive features.72 The primary features of the BITs are 
that they dealt exclusively with investment. They were also in the beginning 
phases negotiated principally between a developed and a developing country. 
The underlying assumption was that the agreement would protect the 
                                                          
67 Gilman N The New International Economic Order: A Reintroduction Humanity Journal available at 
http://humanityjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/HUM-6.1-final-text-GILMAN.pdf (accessed 13 
March 2017). 
68Article 2, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States General Assembly, 1974. 
69 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States General Assembly resolution, 3281(XXIX) available at 
http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cerds/cerds.html (accessed 13 March 2017). 
70Salacuse J BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in 
Developing Countries The International Lawyer 657; Vandevelde  K. ‘A Brief History of International Investment 
Agreements’ International Law and Policy 169; ‘Germany was the first to conclude such an agreement. Having 
lost its foreign investment as a result of its defeat in the Second World War, Germany was especially sensitive 
to the political risks to which foreign investment was exposed. In 1959, Germany concluded the first two bilateral 
investment treaties, one with Pakistan and the other with the Dominican Republic. Other Western European 
countries quickly followed Germany's lead. France concluded its first BIT in 1960, Switzerland in 1961, the 
Netherlands in 1963, Italy and the Belgium-Luxembourg Union76 in 1964, Sweden77 and Denmark in 1965, and 
Norway in 1966.’ 
71Salacuse J BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in 
Developing Countries The International Lawyer 657; Vandevelde  K. ‘A Brief History of International Investment 
Agreements’ International Law and Policy 169; ‘In 1959, Germany concluded the first two bilateral investment 
treaties, one with Pakistan and the other with the Dominican Republic. Other Western European countries 
quickly followed Germany's lead. France concluded its first BIT in 1960, Switzerland  in 1961, the Netherlands in 
1963, Italy and the Belgium-Luxembourg Union76 in 1964, Sweden77 and Denmark in 1965, and Norway  in 
1966.’ 
72 Salacuse J &. Sullivan N, Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand 
Bargain, Harvard International Law .Journal 73; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), bilateral investment treaties in the mid-1990s available at 
https://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjEq
filiJzTAhXrL8AKHXF7ADYQFggaMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Functad.org%2Fen%2Fdocs%2Fiteiia20065_en.pdf&u
sg=AFQjCNHfG0eHuPUon3pTBJYF06egljjGfw&sig2=LT0KVqM8Ph4ZXXEYSObO_A ( accessed 7 March 2010). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
34 
 
investment of the developed country in the territory of the developing 
country.73 
 
In the wake of globalisation and liberalisation of markets, competition for 
foreign investment arose, spurred on by the success of the Asian nations 
particularly the success of China. Developing countries began falling over 
each other in their enthusiasm to court foreign investment.74 Similar to the 
modern FCNs, the BITs contained a clause for investment dispute settlement 
between the parties. This was a slightly different clause to that contained in 
the FCNs, whereas the FCNs had provided for submission of disputes to the 
ICJ the BITs provided for submission of disputes to an ad hoc arbitral 
tribunal.75  
A prime example of a dispute settlement clause contained in a FCN was Article 
XXIV of the 1956 Nicaragua-United States Treaty of Friendship, Commerce 
and Navigation (the FCN Treaty).76 Paragraph 2 of that provision provides:  
"Any dispute between the Parties as to the interpretation or application 
of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be 
submitted to the International Court of Justice, unless the Parties agree 
to settlement by some other specific means." 
                                                          
73 Salacuse J BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in 
Developing Countries The International Lawyer 661. 
74 Salacuse J BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in 
Developing Countries The International Lawyer 672. 
75 Rubins & Kinsella International investment, political risk and dispute resolution. A practitioner’s guide (2005) 
419; The BIT between the United States and Ecuador, art. VII: 
Any dispute between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty which is not resolved 
through consultations or other diplomatic channels, shall be submitted, upon the request of either Party, to an 
arbitral tribunal for binding decision in accordance with the applicable rules of international law. In the absence 
of an agreement by the Parties to the contrary, the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), except to the extent modified by the Parties or by the arbitrators, shall 
govern. Available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43558.pdf (accessed 8 March 2017).  
76 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, Nicaragua – USA 7 UNTS 3 (entered into force 
May 25, 1958). 
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When Nicaragua invoked this clause, it caused a violent reaction by the USA 
as they notified the UN Secretary General of their termination of their 
adherence to the optional regime under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute.77 
The innovations contained in BITs dispute resolution provision seemingly 
solved the problem that a host state could not be subject to the jurisdiction 
of an international tribunal without its consent. In the BIT between the USA 
and Ecuador, the evolution contained is evident. Disputes could now be 
submitted by either party to an arbitral tribunal. However foreign investors 
still needed to exhaust local remedies and to persuade their home state to 
espouse their claim before pursuing a remedy under the ICJ.78  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
77 Reisman M, "The Other Shoe Falls: The Future of Article 36(1) Jurisdiction in the Light of Nicaragua" The 
American Journal of International Law 162. 
78 Vandevelde  K. ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ International Law and Policy 165. 
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2.3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
 
The western nations had long established a dispute settlement mechanism 
during the eighteenth and part of the nineteenth century namely the threat 
or use of force on behalf of their nationals, however this was rarely an end in 
itself.79 As the nineteenth century progressed, arbitration was encouraged 
through the various mixed claims tribunals.80 The model for investment 
dispute settlement in the modern era was provided by the ad hoc tribunals 
which were set up by Great Britain and the United States to resolve the claims 
of their respective nationals.81This prototype, or variations of it,  became the 
standard for later mixed claims commissions.82 
 
The adoption of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes at The Hague greatly advanced international investment dispute 
settlement. Arbitration was recognised as the most effective and equitable, 
means of settling disputes which diplomacy has failed to settle. Chapters II 
and III of the treaty went on to establish, respectively, a Permanent Court of 
Arbitration at The Hague and arbitral procedures to govern its operation. 83 
 
 
                                                          
79 Sornarajah M’ The International Law on Foreign Investment’ 3ed (2010) 23. 
80 Dolzer & Stevens Bilateral Investment Treaties (1995) 123; Sornarajah M’ The International Law on Foreign 
Investment’ 3ed (2010) 23. 
81 Johnson OT & Gimblett T. "From Gunboats to BITs: The Evolution of Modern International Investment Law," 
(2011) Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 653. 
82 Johnson OT & Gimblett T. "From Gunboats to BITs: The Evolution of Modern International Investment Law," 
(2011) Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 659 ; The functions and limits of arbitration and 
judicial settlement under private and public international law,” 18 Duke Journal of Comparative & International 
Law 259 (2008), pp. 266–271 
83 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1899) available at https://pca-cpa.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/175/2016/01/1907-Convention-for-the-Pacific-Settlement-of-International-
Disputes.pdf (accessed 8 March 2017). 
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After World War I there was a renewed interest in arbitration as a means of 
dispute settlement. A more consistent and coherent jurisprudence concerning 
the treatment of alien property began to emerge from the decisions of a variety 
of arbitral institutions.84 The treaty of Versailles set the peace terms between 
Germany and the allied powers and contained several important provisions 
on dispute settlement including that of investments. The treaty established 
mixed arbitral tribunals which were tasked with resolving private disputes 
between nationals of Germany and the allies. This eventually led to the 
creation of the Permanent Court of Justice.85 
As there had been an increase in disputes between private parties, in 1923, 
the League of Nations adopted the Geneva Protocol on arbitration clauses, in 
which the parties agreed to recognise the validity of arbitration agreements 
between private parties.86 The International Chamber of Commerce followed 
suit by adopting rules of arbitration in 1922 and consequently established its 
Court of Arbitration the following year.87 Subsequently in 1927 the Geneva 
Convention for the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, was adopted by the 
League of Nations, contracting States agreed to enforce arbitral awards made 
in conformity with the 1923 Protocol.88  
 
As more BITS were signed, it began the thrust of public international law into 
the private realm. Private persons mostly under the auspices of ICSID and the 
UNCTAD rules were tasked with deciding the fate of nations and making 
decisions that were often against public policy. Thus the tussle for the right 
to regulate began; this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
 
                                                          
84The Treaty of Versailles, 1919. 
85 Johnson OT & Gimblett T. "From Gunboats to BITs: The Evolution of Modern International Investment Law," 
(2011) Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 658. 
86Geneva Protocol, 1923: Protocol on arbitration clauses available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/LON/PARTII-6.en.pdf (accessed 13 March 2017). 
87 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Dispute settlement: International commercial 
arbitration (2005)21. 
88 Geneva Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, September 26, 1927. 
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2.4. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF INVESTMENT DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT 
 
It is interesting to note that the Conventions that are codified and currently 
in existence express the developing nations’ views however they do not have 
enough power to enforce the CERDS or the NIEO. The international 
investment dispute settlement regime is seemingly based on a system which 
relies exclusively on the private power of multinational corporations to exploit 
arbitration, a tool once within the realm of private, consensual dispute 
resolution.89These western nations have also empowered the creation of a 
body of rules that give effect to these arbitral processes.90 These rules that 
have been built up over the years through the manipulation of weak sources 
of international law have become the foundation of international investment 
law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
89 Miles K ‘The origins of international investment law: empire, environment and the safeguarding of capital’ 
(2013) 7. 
90 M Sornarajah ‘The Clash of Globalisations and the International Law on Foreign Investment’ The Simon 
Reisman Lecture in International Trade Policy 13 
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2.4.1. Domestics Courts of the host state 
The default position, in the absence of an agreement under customary law is 
that the injured investor must seek remedy in the host nation’s domestic 
court.91 This is the position taken by the developing countries and it is clearly 
expressed in the CERDS and NIEO.92 These two conventions are still in force 
but have somehow been taken out of existence by the use of BITs which 
include consent to arbitration and provide for investor state dispute 
settlement. African countries particularly reflect this position in their regional 
investment instruments which shall be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
4. 
 
The exhaustion of domestic remedies was a requirement and technically 
remains one in the absence of an agreement stating otherwise. However, given 
the current situation where investor state dispute settlement is contained in 
the agreements, particularly the BITs, it is not a requirement that local 
remedies be exhausted.93  
 
An interesting clause that may result in an investment dispute being 
adjudicated in a domestic court is termed the ‘fork in the road’ clause. This 
provision provides that an investor must elect which forum they would prefer 
to bring the claim in, with the option of a domestic court or an international 
tribunal. Once this choice is made, it is final and the investor will not have 
recourse to any other forum.94However most certainly investors are not 
inclined to bring claims in domestic courts, especially in African nations 
where they fear bias. 
                                                          
91 Dolzer R & Schreuer C Principles of International Investment Law (2008) 214. 
92 Article IV (e) of the UN Declaration on the establishment of New International Economic Order ; Article 2(b) 
of the Charter   
93 Article 26 of the International Convention on the settlement of Investment disputes. 
94 Sornarajah M’ The International Law on Foreign Investment’ 3ed (2010) 438. 
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Over and above BITs, foreign investors often have contracts with host states 
that govern their investments. These contracts will contain forum clauses 
which will give jurisdiction to the host state’s domestic courts. This created a 
problem because when disputes arose investors would invoke the treaty 
provisions allowing for the jurisdiction of an international tribunal, while the 
host states relied on the forum clauses in the contract. This has led to a 
number of arbitration cases with conflicting views, these shall be discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 3.95The situation is further exacerbated by the fact 
that some treaties have jurisdiction over all investment disputes stretching 
out to contract claims.  
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2.4.2. Diplomatic Protection 
 
A state that elects to take up one of its national’s claims through diplomatic 
protection espouses the claim against another state and takes it up in its own 
name. This remedy although still available is dependent on the injured 
investor’s nation; it is exclusively within their discretion whether a claim can 
be espoused or not.96 This remains an untenable option as the protection even 
once given can be taken away. Negotiations between the states can be fruitless 
and when it reaches this level, the investor’s nation may escalate the matter 
to the ICJ. 97 In many instances investors no longer require this protection as 
they have direct access through ISDS. The interrelationship between 
investment protection treaties and the background rules of customary 
international law remains relevant, it has been curtailed by some agreements. 
For example, Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention states explicitly that, for 
ICSID proceedings, the ISDS regime replaces the diplomatic protection 
regime: “No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an 
international claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and 
another Contracting State shall have consented to submit or shall have 
submitted to arbitration under this Convention…’.98 The role of diplomatic 
protection is also in the enforcement of arbitral awards from ISDS.99 Article 
27(1) of the ICSID Convention also provides a place for diplomatic protection 
in the ISDS system. The language quoted above continues: ‘…unless such 
other Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply with the 
award rendered in such dispute.” As more states fail to abide by and comply 
with awards rendered in the ISDS regime, there may be a role for diplomatic 
protection as a supplement to ISDS regime. 
 
                                                          
96 Dolzer R & Schreuer C Principles of International Investment Law (2008) 211. 
97 Dolzer R & Schreuer C Principles of International Investment Law (2008) 212. 
98 Dolzer R & Schreuer C Principles of International Investment Law (2008) 213. 
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2.4.3. Institutionalised Arbitration 
2.4.3.1. ICSID 
 
ICSID was the brainchild of Aaron Broches, the General Counsel of the World 
Bank.100 It was formally adopted within the framework of the World Bank in 
1965 and came into force on 14 October 1966. The motivation behind its 
creation was the provision of satisfactory legal infrastructure for the 
promotion of international private investment.101 This would be by providing 
effective procedures for impartial settlement of disputes rather than by 
seeking multilateral agreement on investment which had already failed.102The 
Convention was designed to facilitate dispute settlement through conciliation 
and arbitration by the establishment of the International centre for the 
settlement of investment disputes (ICSID). This is the responsible body for 
settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals from other 
contracting states.103  
ICSID provides standard clauses that can be used by the parties and detailed 
rules of procedure. This system also allows for the selection of arbitrators and 
the conduct of the proceedings. The centre also provides venue and all 
administrative work is done by them.104 The jurisdiction of ICSID only extends 
to nationals whose states are parties and states that are party to the 
Convention.105 
                                                          
100Schreuer C The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 2ed (2009) 10; This initiative carried forward a more general 
one for the protection of international investment that had begun in the Organisation for European Economic 
Co-operation (now the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) in the late 1950s and that 
ended in the production in 1962 of the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property. 
101 The International Chamber of Commerce followed suit by adopting rules of arbitration in 1922 and 
consequently established its Court of Arbitration the following year.101 
102 Schreuer C The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 2ed (2009) 10. 
103 Article 1 of the Convention for the International Settlement of Investment Disputes, 1966. 
104 Dolzer R & Schreuer C Principles of International Investment Law (2008) 223. 
105 Article 25 (1) of the Convention for the International Settlement of Investment Disputes, 1966.’The 
jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a 
Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by 
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The institutionalisation of arbitration through ICSID introduced key features 
in international investment law which have now become somewhat jus 
cogens.106 State immunity was restricted as the Convention is self-contained. 
It is independent of the interference of any body; no domestic court can stay, 
compel or set aside an award.107 ICSID awards are binding and final and 
cannot be subjected to review unless they meet very narrow conditions.108 All 
awards are to be enforced as a final judgement of a domestic court in all states 
party to the Convention.109 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
that State) and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to 
submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.’ 
106 Dolzer R & Schreuer C Principles of International Investment Law (2008) 223. 
107 Dolzer R & Schreuer C Principles of International Investment Law (2008) 223; Schreuer C The ICSID 
Convention: A Commentary 2ed (2009) 10. 
108 Article 53 of the Convention for the International Settlement of Investment Disputes, 1966. 
109  Article 54 of the Convention for the International Settlement of Investment Disputes, 1966. 
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2.4.3.2. ICSID Additional Facility 
 
The ICSID Additional Facility was created on September 27, 1978. It offers 
arbitration, conciliation, and fact-finding services for certain disputes that fall 
outside the scope of the ICSID Convention.110 It is open to a state and a foreign 
national, one of which is not an ICSID member state or a national of an ICSID 
member state to subject them to the jurisdiction.111 Arbitration or conciliation 
of disputes is not governed by the ICSID Convention; it is only the Additional 
Facility rules which apply. The drawback with this is that the ICSID 
Convention is not applicable even to the awards issued by the Additional 
Facility; therefore, enforcement of the award may be problematic. The 
applicable law for the enforcement of awards rendered by the Additional 
Facility is the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards of 1958.112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
110 Article 54 of the Convention for the International Settlement of Investment Disputes, 1966. 
111 Article 2 of the Additional Facility Rules provides : ‘The Secretariat of the Centre is hereby authorized to 
administer, subject to and in accordance with these Rules, proceedings between a State (or a constituent 
subdivision or agency of a State) and a national of another State, falling within the following categories’. 
112 Dolzer R & Schreuer C Principles of International Investment Law (2008) 225. 
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2.4.3.3. UNCITRAL 
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules 
on Commercial Arbitration, 1976 were created specifically for commercial 
disputes, but they are used for investment disputes at times.113 These rules 
do not provide a system to administer proceedings like ICSID, they merely 
provide rules which can be applied under any existing institution. It is up to 
the parties to provide the administrative framework and they may create an 
ad hoc tribunal anywhere.114 
UNCITRAL has taken a positive step by creating rules for transparency in 
arbitral proceedings, particularly investment treaty arbitration.115 The rules 
on transparency apply in relation to disputes arising out of treaties concluded 
prior to 1 April 2014, when parties to the relevant treaty, or disputing parties, 
agree to their application. The rules also apply in relation to disputes arising 
out of treaties concluded on or after 1 April 2014 , when ISDS is initiated 
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, unless the parties otherwise agree.116 
These rules are also available for use in investor-state arbitrations initiated 
under rules other than the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, and in ad hoc 
proceedings.117 These rules have been cemented by the United Nations 
Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, 
which entered into force on 18 October 2017.118 The Convention is an 
instrument by which parties to investment treaties concluded before 1 April 
2014 express their consent to apply the UNCITRAL rules on transparency. 
This convention supplements existing investment treaties with respect to 
transparency-related obligations. 
                                                          
113Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly 40/72. Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law:  ‘Recognizing the value of arbitration as a method 
of settling disputes arising in international commercial relations’. 
114 Dolzer R & Schreuer C Principles of International Investment Law (2008) 228. 
115 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (2014). 
116 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (2014). 
117 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (2014). 
118 United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (New York, 2014) 
(the "Mauritius Convention on Transparency"). 
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2.4.3.4. The International Chamber of Commerce 
This is an arbitral institution that was founded in 1919 with its seat in Paris. 
It was initially started as a chamber where dialogue was encouraged among 
stakeholders. It has evolved into machinery that advances the interests of 
private businesses.119 The ICC provides guidance and administrative 
assistance for individual cases.  
 
2.4.3.5. The London Court of International Arbitration 
This was previously the London Chamber of Arbitration which had been 
established in 1892. It was designed to deal with purely commercial disputes 
but its reach has extended to investor-state dispute settlement. It has its own 
set of rules but if requested it can apply UNCITRAL rules. 
 
 
2.4.3.6. The Permanent court of Arbitration 
As stated in the previous section, this court was established by the 
Convention on Pacific settlement of international disputes. Despite the name 
this is not a court but it administers and facilitates arbitration and 
conciliation. Unlike the ICJ, the Permanent Court of Arbitration has no sitting 
judges: the parties themselves select the arbitrators. The sessions of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration are held in private and are confidential. The 
Court also provides arbitration in disputes between international 
organisations and between states and international organisations.120 
 
                                                          
119https://iccwbo.org/chamber-services/world-chambers-federation/history-chamber-movement/ (accessed 
13 March 2017). 
120 http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=311 (accessed 13 March 2017). 
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2.4.4. Ad hoc arbitration 
 
If arbitration is not supported by a particular arbitration institution, it is 
referred to as ad hoc arbitration. Ad hoc arbitration requires an arbitration 
agreement that regulates a number of issues. These include the selection of 
arbitrators, the applicable law and a large number of procedural questions.121 
 
The institutionalisation of the right of autonomous recourse to a remedy in 
the treaties has resulted in the creation of an investment protection regime 
which does not cater to the interests of developing countries at all.122 Too 
much power is handed over to multinational corporations and shrewd counsel 
to devise means to check against the ability of states to respond to economic 
or other situations that pose harm to the social interests of the people. To that 
extent, the charge that the current investment dispute settlement mechanism 
serves the interests of multinational corporations exclusively is well made 
out.123This task is made easy by the existence of a permanent specialist 
arbitral institutions, such as ICSID, which facilitate disputes for parties to the 
Convention.124 
 
 
                                                          
121 Dolzer R & Schreuer C Principles of International Investment Law (2008) 225. 
122 M Sornarajah ‘The Clash of Globalisations and the International Law on Foreign Investment’ The Simon 
Reisman Lecture in International Trade Policy 16. 
123 M Sornarajah ‘The Clash of Globalisations and the International Law on Foreign Investment’ The Simon 
Reisman Lecture in International Trade Policy 16. 
124 M Sornarajah ‘The Clash of Globalisations and the International Law on Foreign Investment’ The Simon 
Reisman Lecture in International Trade Policy 13. 
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2.5. INVESTMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN AFRICA 
 
The regulation of foreign investment in Africa like the rest of the world is 
scattered across several treaties and even some RTAs. Therefore, it follows 
that the investment dispute settlement system is governed by the same 
agreements. It must be noted that investment regulations that are to be 
discussed in this thesis, largely govern inter-African investments. It has 
already been seen that African nations as part of the developing states hold 
no power in the negotiation of BITS which resultantly govern the investment 
and the dispute settlement system.125 
 
Ofodile posits that while African countries appear to be mute on the on-going 
debate about the investment dispute settlement system, these countries have 
not been particularly silent on the substance of the debate and are critical of 
the current system.126 Ofodile argues that, the position of countries in Africa 
can be gleaned from their approach to the settlement of investment disputes 
at the sub-regional level, particularly in Eastern and Southern Africa. This is 
evidenced by the IIAs for the COMESA Common Investment Area (CCIA) and 
in the SADC FIP as these represent attempts by some countries in Africa to 
introduce features in the settlement of investment disputes that will 
transform the traditional approach.127 
 
 
                                                          
125 M Sornarajah ‘The Clash of Globalisations and the International Law on Foreign Investment’ The Simon 
Reisman Lecture in International Trade Policy 9; Developed countries often drafted BITs then gave them to 
developing nations for signature, which they signed with little to no changes. 
126 Ofodile U ‘Africa and the System of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: To Reject or Not to Reject?’ available 
at http://blogaila.com/2014/10/12/africa-and-the-system-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement-to-reject-or-
not-to-reject-uche-ewelukwa-ofodile/ (accessed 13 March 2017). 
127 Ofodile U ‘Africa and the System of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: To Reject or Not to Reject?’ available 
at http://blogaila.com/2014/10/12/africa-and-the-system-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement-to-reject-or-
not-to-reject-uche-ewelukwa-ofodile/ (accessed 13 March 2017). 
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It has been noted that even when African states have become party to the 
relevant treaties, there remains the perception that their courts cannot be 
relied on to apply the text correctly or in good faith.128 Further to that the 
national legal frameworks are viewed as not conducive for the constitution of 
arbitral tribunals and to conduct arbitration, permitting the local court to 
interfere unduly in arbitral proceedings.129 Africa is home to multiple 
institutional arbitration centres such as the Cairo Regional Centre for 
International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA). Although most centres host 
commercial arbitration matters,  it has been observed that much more needs 
to be done to enhance their capacity in terms of the number and quality of 
arbitrators, adequate staff and finances to ensure that they are up to task in 
facilitation of investment arbitration.130 There have been inadequate legal 
regimes and infrastructure for the efficient and effective organization and 
conduct of international commercial arbitration in some of the African 
countries with some countries still having archaic laws.131 This has denied 
the local international arbitrators the fora to display their skills and expertise 
in international commercial arbitration since disputants shun the local 
arbitral institutions, if any, for foreign institutions.132 There is need to ensure 
that African countries review and harmonise their arbitration laws so as to 
ensure that arbitration institutions emerge across Africa.133  
 
By formulating their own investment rules, African nations are beginning to 
control their destiny in the development of international investment law. They 
have adopted investment instruments which they consider to be more 
adequate in light of the specific needs of African countries. The current 
agreements that are being drafted seek to attract foreign investment and to 
                                                          
128 McLaughlin JT, “Arbitration and Developing Countries,” The International Lawyer, Vol. 13, No. 2. 212.   
129McLaughlin JT, “Arbitration and Developing Countries,” The International Lawyer, Vol. 13, No.212.   
130 Muigua Making East Africa a Hub for International Commercial Arbitration: A Critical Examination of the State 
of the Legal and Institutional Framework Governing Arbitration in Kenya  14. 
131 Muigua K, „Promoting International Commercial Arbitration in Africa‟, 14.    
132 Muigua K, ‘Reawakening Arbitral Institutions for Development of Arbitration in Africa’ 23. 
133 Muigua K, ‘Reawakening Arbitral Institutions for Development of Arbitration in Africa’ 23. 
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achieve sustainable development objectives.134 It is pertinent to state the 
African position after having discussed the history of the investment dispute 
settlement system. It becomes apparent that African states have largely been 
spectators in the development of the investment dispute settlement system, 
this has now started to change with the onset of inter-African investment 
agreements. The succeeding chapter will focus on the issues in the current 
investment disputes settlement regime particularly those faced by African 
states.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
134 Mbengue M ‘The quest for a Pan-African Investment code to achieve sustainable development’ Bridges 
Africa Volume 5 (2016). 
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2.6. CONCLUSION 
 
In the modern era it is discouraging to see that international investment law 
does not consider the intentions behind countries' behaviour, merely the 
practice and sense of legal obligation. The view that there should be automatic 
dispute settlement at the instance of a foreign investor has already clashed 
with the sovereignty centred approach that limits the right of the foreign 
investor to the tribunals of the host state135 
 
Although the standard of protection of foreign investment is currently based 
on the Hull formula and it could, at one time, lay claim to the status of 
customary international law, it can no longer be said to represent a binding 
international legal norm. A cursory glance at the African instruments on 
investment will show their stance is geared toward the Calvo doctrine, despite 
signing BITs which contradict this position. This resultant change is the result 
of disagreement between developed and developing countries as to the validity 
of the Hull Rule. Developing countries particularly African states taken as a 
group are generally importers of investment, while most of the outward foreign 
investment is made from developed countries.136  
 
On the one hand, the capital-exporting countries require some measure of 
protection and security before they will invest abroad and, on the other hand, 
the capital-importing countries are wary of the power of foreign investments 
and the drain of currency that occurs, and are often stimulated to take over 
such enterprises.137 The imposition of an absolute notion of property through 
                                                          
135M Sornarajah ‘The Clash of Globalisations and the International Law on Foreign Investment’ The Simon 
Reisman Lecture in International Trade Policy 7. 
136Guzman AT ‘Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties: Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt 
Them’ available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/97/97-12-III.html; The onset of the 
NAFTA has altered this position as developed countries have recently become recipients of investment. 
137 Shaw & Malcolm ‘ International Law’ 5ed ( 2008) 738. 
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investment treaties sits uneasily with the internal constitutional systems of 
the large majority of the states of the world. It would amount to an affront to 
the right of states to organise their economies on any system they prefer.138 
 
The general view among developing countries is that they should have the 
freedom to decide policies on foreign investment. This is a freedom that to a 
large extent has been denied by the increasing treaty practice that seeks to 
bind developing countries to the neo-liberal prescriptions. The international 
law, has been developed by the capital exporting countries to tie the 
developing countries to neo-liberal viewpoints.139 
The whole international investment regime is based on western ideologies that 
have been imposed on developing nations.140It is interesting to note that the 
United States in its formative years, as an importer of European capital, had 
experiences like those which developing countries presently have, and took 
stances not dissimilar to those developing countries now take.141  
African nations are coming to the fore through promulgation of investment 
provisions in the regional trade agreements. They have essentially spelled out 
the nature of investment that is wanted in the region, which is investment 
that is sustainable and fosters development. The resultant investment dispute 
settlement regime has received widespread backlash, as it has failed to 
address the issues faced by countries such as inconsistent decisions. As 
developing nations African states cannot afford to have huge damage claims 
awarded against them. More so because there are so many developmental 
                                                          
138 M Sornarajah The Clash of Globalisations and the International Law on Foreign Investment  The Simon 
Reisman Lecture in International Trade Policy 11 
139M Sornarajah ‘The Clash of Globalisations and the International Law on Foreign Investment’  The Simon 
Reisman Lecture in International Trade Policy 26 
140 Sornarajah M’ The International Law on Foreign Investment’ 3ed (2010) 20; It was in the relations between 
the United States, still a fledgling power, and its Latin American neighbours that the need for the development 
of an international law relating to foreign investment played a role during the period prior to the Second 
World War.63 These developments have dictated the course of the law for a considerable period of time. In 
the foreign investment relations between the United States and the Latin American states, one sees the clash 
between the idea that an alien investor should be confined to the remedies available in local law to the citizen 
and the idea that he must be accorded the treatment according to an external, international standard. 
141 Sornarajah M’ The International Law on Foreign Investment’ 3ed (2010) 20. 
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issues that plague African states. Issues arise when states have to balance 
the rights of an investor against the public policy and developmental 
concerns, these issues shall be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.  
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CHAPTER 3 
3. THE CURRENT ISSUES IN INVESTMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
There is growing discontent with the current investment dispute settlement 
system. The issues faced by this system have been informed by the history as 
illustrated in Chapter 2. This hegemonic system of investment dispute 
resolution created by imperial powers as a way to protect investments has 
become a creature even the developed countries have lost control of. This is 
evidenced by the resistance that the EU has faced with acceptance of the 
CETA Tribunal and ISDS provisions in FTAs.142 Developing countries have 
slowly realised that there really is no plausible link between foreign direct 
investment flow and the signing of BITS.143 There is now a realisation of the 
impact that BITs have on public policy.  
 
When reform of the current investment regime is mentioned it largely speaks 
to the reform of the investment dispute settlement system and application of 
the investment protection standards. The bedrock of the international 
investment regime is investment protection which entails fair and equitable 
treatment, protection against expropriation and payment of compensation as 
the standards of protection.144 The lack of uniformity in the application of 
these standards in arbitration tribunals has created issues for African host 
nations as their public policy has often been challenged.145 These very 
                                                          
142 Biel E & Wheeler M ‘The Uncertain Future of the European Investment Court System’ available at 
http://www.yjil.yale.edu/the-uncertain-future-of-the-european-investment-court-system/.  
143 Salacuse J &. Sullivan N, Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand 
Bargain, Harvard International Law .Journal; See UNCTAD, The Role of International Investment Agreements in 
Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries. UNCTAD Series on International Investment 
Policies for Development, New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2009. 
144 M Sornarajah The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes (2000)77. 
145 M Sornarajah ‘The Clash of Globalisations and the International Law on Foreign Investment’ The Simon 
Reisman Lecture in International Trade Policy 13. 
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standards of protection have become the basis of numerous investment 
disputes. Instead of bringing the anticipated development, African nations 
have had to pay out huge damages claims to the detriment of their poor 
population. The existence of such an expansive network of rights means that, 
when difficulties arise, there is a patchwork of mechanisms to resolve the 
investment disputes.146 The growth of international investment arbitration is 
attributable to investor approval with the system, as it is a claimant-investor 
driven system. In other words, dissatisfaction with the status quo is coming 
primarily from the respondent side of the dispute i.e. the host states.147 For 
developing country host states it is even more daunting as they do not have 
the resources to defend the claims or to settle the claims.148 Currently ICSID 
reports that 25 per cent of investor dispute claims are against African 
countries.149 
 
The lack of precedent raises issues as to whether vital issues that concern a 
nation should be decided by arbitration tribunals that consist of foreigners of 
whatever reputation, who are unconcerned with the impact of their decisions 
on communities that they have had little experience of.150 More so in the case 
of African countries whose public policy decisions impact on millions of 
livelihoods.  
 
 
                                                          
146 Franck S D ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through 
Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham L Rev 1523 
147 Behn D ‘Legitimacy, evolution, and growth in investment treaty arbitration: empirically evaluating the state-
of-the-art’ Georgetown Journal of International law 364. 
148 M Sornarajah The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes (2000)78. 
149 ICSID – The ICSID caseload –Issue 2 2017 10. 
150 Franck S D ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through 
Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham L Rev 1533  ; ‘This has been happening with great frequency as far as 
developing countries have been concerned for over decades. But now that it is affecting the relatively rich 
countries. Hence, issues are being raised as to the appropriateness of three foreigners, over whom there is no 
check, deciding on issues of vital concern to political communities on the basis of largely commercial principles.’ 
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Governments find themselves at the mercy of private investors who have 
brought them to task over largely public policy issues and regulation.151 The 
lack of a multilateral approach and fragmented nature of the resolution of 
investment disputes makes it a complex area. Forum shopping and tribunal 
hopping has occurred often.152  
 
This chapter explores the multiplex of problems faced by the current 
investment dispute settlement system and the proffered solutions. This 
chapter will analyse whether these solutions would be applicable to 
developing countries, particularly African nations. It would be amiss to speak 
of the investment dispute resolution system without taking examining the 
main bone of contention, which is ISDS. The first part of the chapter will 
examine this phenomenon as a whole and then the particular issues arising 
from this system will be analysed in subsequent parts. The chapter will then 
focus on issues specific to developing countries, particularly African states 
and the solutions proffered for the current legitimacy crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
151 Wells LT ‘Backlash to investment arbitration: three causes’ in Waibel M et al (eds) The backlash against 
investment arbitration: perceptions and reality (2010) 344. 
152 Reinisch A’ The issues raised by parallel proceedings’ in Waibel M et al (eds) The backlash against investment 
arbitration: perceptions and reality (2010) 114. 
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3.2. OVERVIEW OF THE INVESTOR -STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT  
 
ISDS is a phenomenon that was introduced by BITs and IIAs, as reflected in 
the previous chapter. This was largely so that capital exporting countries 
could protect their investments without states having to be involved and 
therefore removing political risk.153 ISDS is when a nation grants private 
investors the right to bring suit against the sovereign in the case of a breach 
of treaty rights. BITS extend substantive rights to investors of treaty partners, 
these rights are protected by the procedural rights which allow for the private 
investor to bring claims against the sovereign in case of breach of its 
obligations.154  
Unlike conventional arbitration, investment treaty arbitration is non-
reciprocal in nature. Only investors can institute claims under an investment 
treaty, states have no recourse except through counter-claims.155 Essentially, 
the system removes the customary international law duty to exhaust domestic 
remedies before proceeding to an international claim against a state. However, 
unlike national or international courts that otherwise resolve these types of 
claims, investment treaty arbitration does not incorporate certain 
institutional safeguards of judicial independence such as secure judicial 
tenure, objective methods of appointment of judges to specific cases, and 
restrictions on outside remuneration of the judge. There is also no appeal 
mechanism, save for a few exceptional cases where an award may be annulled 
under ICSID.156 
 
                                                          
153Salacuse J ‘BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment 
in Developing Countries’ The International Lawyer 657. 
154 Vandevelde  K. ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ International Law and Policy 169. 
155 Wells LT ‘Backlash to investment arbitration: three causes’ in Waibel M et al (eds) The backlash against 
investment arbitration: perceptions and reality (2010) 340. 
156 G Van Hearten ‘Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of Investment Treaty 
Arbitration’ Osgoode Hall Law Journal Volume 50 Issue 1 (2012) 228. 
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The most frequently used mode of investment dispute settlement is 
arbitration through ICSID, which accounts for over 60 per cent of the cases 
brought worldwide.157 When it comes to investment arbitration, the problems 
are not uniform.158 There are numerous candidates willing and in most cases 
qualified to sit as arbitrators; and the process is, in general, believed to be 
efficient. Other problems however do arise. One is that many arbitrators are 
drawn from the ranks of practitioners. Naturally they have to avoid the usual 
problem of conflict of interest, but this may not always be observed. Some 
claim, for instance, that there is a conflict of interest if one is sitting as an 
arbitrator in a case where a particular point arises, when another member of 
the same law firm is also arguing about the same point as counsel in a 
different case.159 
 
Recently, there has been debate over the question of the transparency of 
proceedings between states on the one hand, and private investors on the 
other, and the somewhat related question of participation in the proceedings 
by third parties.160 Investment arbitration between States and companies or 
individuals has tended to follow the model of private law arbitration, including 
to a large extent its secrecy.161 It has to be acknowledged that investor-state 
disputes are not the same as international commercial disputes nor are the 
mechanisms in which they are often settled.162 As a form of privatised dispute 
resolution, investment arbitration has empowered investors, and their home 
states, to argue that host states should be disciplined for breach of investment 
treaty standards. This is an illustration, for Sornarajah, of how ‘private power 
                                                          
157 The ICSID Caseload – Statistics (Issue 2017-2) available at  
158 Wells LT ‘Backlash to investment arbitration: three causes’ in Waibel M et al (eds) The backlash against 
investment arbitration: perceptions and reality (2010) 341. 
159 Franck S D ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law 
through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham L Rev 1552. 
160 Kawharu A ‘Participation of non-governmental organisations in investment arbitration as amici curae’ in 
Waibel M et al (eds) The backlash against investment arbitration: perceptions and reality (2010) 284. 
161 Article 48(5) of the ICSID Convention 1985 ‘The Centre shall not publish the award without the consent of 
the parties.’ 
162 Maniruzzaman M, 'A Rethink of Investor-State Dispute Settlement', Kluwer Arbitration Blog, May 30 2013, 
available at http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2013/05/30/a-rethink-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement 
(accessed 23 April 2017). 
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can be used to formulate norms with claims to be principles of international 
law’. 163 
 
From early on, ICSID adopted the practice of publishing information about 
what cases had been brought, between whom, and what stage procedurally 
they were at. However, Article 48(5) of the ICSID Convention provides that the 
award itself may not be published without the consent of both parties.164 This 
still leaves the most vital part of the dispute out of the public eye. 
 
Overlapping, or even conflicting, jurisdiction can also give rise to its own 
problems. These problems of overlapping or conflicting jurisdiction, or of 
inconsistent decisions, are not confined to the plethora of international 
tribunals: there can also be overlaps of jurisdiction or inconsistent decisions 
between municipal courts on the one hand, and international tribunals on 
the other.165 The lack of a review method or appeal mechanism exacerbates 
this problem, as when faulty decisions are handed down especially by ad hoc 
tribunals then the parties have no recourse.166 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
163M Sornarajah The International Law on Foreign Investment (2010)62. 
164 Mendelsohn M ‘International dispute settlement: developments and challenges’ Revue helle-nique de droit 
international 61 RHDI 463 2008 468. 
165 Mendelsohn M ‘International dispute settlement: developments and challenges’ Revue helle-nique de droit 
international 474. 
166 Wells LT ‘Backlash to investment arbitration: three causes’ in Waibel M et al (eds) The backlash against 
investment arbitration: perceptions and reality (2010) 342. 
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3.3. CURRENT ISSUES IN INVESTOR STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT  
3.3.1. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES 
3.3.1.1. APPLICATION OF THE BIT STANDARDS  
The basis of most ISDS claims has been some substantive rights contained in 
BITS and IIAs. The issue arising is that there is a broad interpretation of 
investment protection provisions.167 Some public international law rights 
have been articulated for the first time in investment treaties such as the right 
to fair and equitable treatment and a nation's obligation to observe its 
commitments. Tribunals have applied these standards differently and made 
divergent findings on liability, this will be illustrated in the Czech cases below. 
Rather than creating certainty for foreign investors and sovereigns, the 
process of resolving investment disputes through arbitration is creating 
uncertainty about the meaning of those rights and public international law.168  
 
This had led to a series of inconsistent decisions. For example, in the Société 
Générale de Surveillance S.A (SGS) cases, SGS provided customs services to 
governments, such as Pakistan and the Philippines, under service contracts. 
There were problems under those contracts. SGS brought a claim against 
Pakistan under the Swiss/Pakistan treaty alleging a violation of the so-called 
umbrella clause;169 likewise, SGS brought a claim against the Philippines for 
a violation of a textually similar umbrella clause in the Swiss/Philippines 
BIT.170 The issue for both tribunals was whether the umbrella clause 
transforms a breach of contract into a breach of treaty. Essentially, one 
tribunal said “yes” and the other said “no.” In this instance it is clear that 
both cases were based on the same agreement with almost identical facts but 
the tribunals still came to opposing decisions. The substantive issues are 
                                                          
167 Horn N ‘Arbitration and the protection of foreign investment: concept and means’ ‘in Arbitrating Foreign 
Investment disputes 2004 Volume 19 17. 
168 Horn N ‘Arbitration and the protection of foreign investment: concept and means’ ‘in Arbitrating Foreign 
Investment disputes 2004 Volume 19 17. 
169 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13. 
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beyond the scope of this thesis; the focus is on the problems created by the 
procedural rules in terms of which substantive issues are decided. 
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3.3.2. PROCEDURAL ISSUES  
3.3.2.1. INCONSISTENT DECISIONS 
Inconsistent decisions generally arise under three typical circumstances. 
First, different tribunals can come to different conclusions about the same 
standard in the same treaty as in the Czech cases below.171 Secondly, different 
tribunals organised under different treaties can come to different conclusions 
about disputes involving the same facts, related parties, and similar 
investment rights. These types of cases will typically involve investments that 
have been structured to take advantage of multiple investment treaties so 
that, when a dispute arises, claims can be brought by related corporate 
entities under different treaties.172 Finally, different tribunals organised under 
different investment treaties will consider disputes involving a similar 
situation and similar investment rights, but will come to opposite 
conclusions.173 This issue arose out of a dispute between a British project 
company, held jointly by a British and a German company, and the Republic 
of Tanzania over a concession to operate the water and sewerage services of 
Tanzania’s capital, Dar es Salaam.174 Tanzania cancelled a contract in 2005 
on the grounds that Biwater had failed to deliver promised services. Biwater 
initiated at first proceedings in the United Kingdom in terms of the UNCITRAL 
rules. The company alleged Tanzania violated the terms of its contract with 
Biwater. In January 2008, the tribunal deciding the case ruled that Biwater 
should actually pay US$8 million to Tanzania. Biwater also filed suit at ICSID, 
where it sought to enforce the terms of the Tanzania – United Kingdom BIT.175 
In July 2008, the ICSID panel ruled for Biwater, but refused to grant any 
damages. 
 
                                                          
171 Reinisch A’ The issues raised by parallel proceedings’ in Waibel M et al (eds) The backlash against 
investment arbitration: perceptions and reality (2010) 116. 
172 Kreindler RH ‘Parallel proceedings: A practitioner’s perspective’ in Waibel M et al (eds) The backlash against 
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The surge in the number of investment arbitrations and the strategic 
structuring of investments to create claims under multiple investment treaties 
increase the likelihood of inconsistent decisions.176 To begin with, there is an 
increased risk of politicising the oversight of arbitral awards. As issues of 
public policy come to the fore there is a real possibility that national courts 
will be tempted to use local law to vitiate an award.177 Second, because of the 
lack of uniformity and the fragmented nature of the oversight, clever investors 
will strategically pick forums to favour their interests. This inadvertently leads 
to the issue of forum shopping.178 Since enforcement proceedings may be 
brought in any jurisdiction where there are assets belonging to the state party, 
the possibility of going to different fora encourages dissatisfied parties to 
forum shop for the best result thereby promoting inefficiency.179 This 
essentially means the burden on host governments is greatly increased as 
they must be compliant with all BITS towards all investors or risk having a 
dispute invoked through any BIT through the most favoured nation clause180. 
This was illustrated in the ‘Czech cases’.181 This adds to the lack of legitimacy 
                                                          
176 Wells LT ‘Backlash to investment arbitration: three causes’ in Waibel M et al (eds) The backlash against 
investment arbitration: perceptions and reality (2010) 344. 
177 Wells LT ‘Backlash to investment arbitration: three causes’ in Waibel M et al (eds) The backlash against 
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178 Reinisch A’ The issues raised by parallel proceedings’ in Waibel M et al (eds) The backlash against investment 
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179 Reinisch A’ The issues raised by parallel proceedings’ in Waibel M et al (eds) The backlash against investment 
arbitration: perceptions and reality (2010) 118. 
180 Reinisch A’ The issues raised by parallel proceedings’ in Waibel M et al (eds) The backlash against investment 
arbitration: perceptions and reality (2010) 118. 
181 The “Czech cases”, (CME/Lauder v. the Czech Republic) and the approximately 40 cases against Argentina and 
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Republic was subject to two different UNCITRAL proceedings concerning certain governmental measures with 
regard to a local company that owned a TV license. The claims were brought almost simultaneously by the 
ultimate controlling shareholder, an American investor, Lauder, under the US-Czech Republic BIT in London and 
by a Dutch company, the CME Czech Republic, which held shares in the local company under the Netherlands-
Czech Republic BIT in Stockholm. The Czech Republic prevailed against Lauder, but was ordered to pay a 
substantial compensation to CME. The Lauder Tribunal acknowledged the potential problem of conflicting 
awards, noting “that damages [could] be concurrently granted by more than one court or arbitral tribunal…” 
Nevertheless, it reasoned that “the second deciding court or arbitral tribunal could take this fact into 
consideration when assessing the final damage”. The CME Tribunal addressed the ramifications of the parties’ 
parallel proceedings but found no bar to adjudicating the same dispute: 
“The Czech Republic did not agree to consolidate the Treaty proceedings, a request raised by the Claimant 
(again) during these arbitration proceedings. The Czech government asserted the right to have each action 
determined independently and promptly. This has the consequence that there will be two awards on the same 
subject which may be consistent with each other or may differ. Should two different Treaties grant remedies to 
the respective claimants deriving from the same facts and circumstance, this does not deprive one of the 
claimants of jurisdiction, if jurisdiction is granted under the respective Treaty. A possible abuse by Mr. Lauder in 
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in investment dispute settlement, when parties have all options available and 
are able to choose the optimal one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
pursuing his claim under the US Treaty as alleged by the Respondents does not affect jurisdiction in these 
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3.3.2.2. TRANSPARENCY  
 
The lack of transparency in investment dispute settlement has raised uproar 
as sovereign nations are accountable to the citizenry that has placed them in 
power. Mendelsohn believes there are two main reasons the issue of secrecy 
has been contentious. The first is that it is thought constructive to the 
development of precedent in investment, if the parties and the arbitrators 
have the benefit of previous tribunals' considerations on the same issue for 
quite often the issues are the same, or at least similar. This would supposedly 
solve the issue of inconsistent decisions. The second argument is that the 
issues involved in investment disputes are not purely private. For one thing, 
the state itself is a public entity. Moreover, the ramifications of the outcome 
are of great interest to the nationals of the host state.182  
 
Arguments against transparency, usually motivated by multi-national 
corporations are that, commercial confidentiality could be jeopardised.183 This 
does not seem to be a strong argument however, what should be borne in 
mind is that lack of transparency has another advantage. If the dispute is 
carried on in the full glare of the public, or even if the parties know that the 
awards, and perhaps even the pleadings, are going to be published, they are 
less likely to reach a settlement or even to consider changing their position. 
Instead, they will want to justify conduct that they know is not justifiable, and 
the host State may be afraid of not being thought to have defended the 
national interest with sufficient vigour.184 Therefore, the arguments in favour 
of greater transparency are not all one sided. 
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The pressure for transparency is even more from self-appointed amici curiae. 
The entity seeking to intervene might be another company, a local government 
body, or a non-governmental organization from the host country or from some 
other country or countries.185 There is minimal access to the pleadings and 
evidence, there is little opportunity for amici curiae participation, and often 
the decisions themselves are confidential and not made available to the 
public. Given the public nature of the rights at issue, parties are 
disseminating more awards and, in limited instances, tribunals permit third 
parties to participate in the dispute process.186 It has been argued that 
intervention of this type inevitably complicates and protracts arbitral 
proceedings.187 For one thing, the principal parties, the investor and the host 
State, can find themselves fighting on more than one front, and mainly 
because of this, proceedings are inevitably prolonged. Intervention is also 
likely to increase the contentiousness of the proceedings.188 The benefits of 
third-party intervention are not necessarily all one way. Nevertheless, there 
has been a groundswell in favour of allowing it. Recently, ICSID has heeded 
to the call for third party participation and amended its own Arbitration Rules 
to permit it where, and to the extent, that the tribunal thinks it appropriate. 
189 
 
The issue of transparency and public availability of awards is improving 
slightly but continues to present significant challenges. Part of the problem 
stems from the decentralised and largely non-institutionalised structure of 
investment treaty arbitration. There is no single institution that can provide 
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a collective registry of all cases; they remain scattered among a number of 
institutions.190 As investment arbitration is based upon a model of 
commercial arbitration where there are strong presumptions of 
confidentiality, even though a state which is by and large a public entity, is 
involved, the dispute resolution process is not transparent. The recent 
addition to the UNCITRAL rules to include rules for transparency targeted for 
investment dispute has been welcomed.191 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
190 Behn D ‘Legitimacy, evolution, and growth in investment treaty arbitration: empirically evaluating the state-
of-the-art’ Georgetown Journal of International law 413. 
191 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (2014). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
68 
 
3.3.2.3. COMPOSITION OF THE TRIBUNAL 
 
In order to ensure the legitimacy of investment arbitration, decision makers 
who will be safeguarding the interpretive determinacy must themselves be 
recognised as legitimate. There are three main issues that plague the 
legitimacy of arbitrators in international investment dispute settlement. The 
first issue is that of impartiality. Sornarajah has quipped that, by imposing 
arbitrators’ preferred solutions to resolve investment disputes, the “only 
general principle that seems to be indicated by these awards, if it could, 
indeed, be dignified by the term, principle is that the big boy always 
wins.”192Arbitrators are likely to interpret substantive protections generously 
when claimants are from capital exporting states such as the United States of 
America, the United Kingdom and France and take a more restrictive 
approach when investors are from elsewhere.193 Arbitrators are believed to be 
biased towards the appointing party which is usually a multinational from a 
western nation.194 
 
The second issue is a perceived lack of independence. This commonly arises 
due to the fact that there are often relationships between the arbitrator and 
one party or its lawyer.195 There are criticisms that the choice of arbitrators is 
biased in the favour of the investors because they most likely come from a 
community of lawyers from metropolitan law firms who more often than not 
                                                          
192 M Sornarajah The International Law on Foreign Investment (2010) 62;‘ ‘indicates not only the power of 
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be used as an instrument of private power through weak sources of law such as the awards of arbitral tribunals 
and the writings of highly qualified publicists. The role of the latter, who are but individuals with partialities to 
certain views either because they believe firmly in them or because it is lucrative to do so, requires a view of 
international law not as a scientifically neutral discipline but as a manipulable device which serves the interests 
of power.’ 
193 G Van Harten, Sold down the Yangtze: Canada’s Lopsided Investment Deal with China (Toronto: International 
Investment Arbitration and Public Policy, 2015) at 121. 
194 Crina Baltag ‘Blind appointments and international arbitrators’ 25 November 2016, available at 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/11/25/blind-appointments-and-international-arbitrators/ (accessed 5 
May 2017). 
195 Park WW ‘Arbitrator integrity’ in Waibel M et al (eds) The backlash against investment arbitration: 
perceptions and reality (2010) 194. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
69 
 
decide in favour of the investors.196 This is made evident by the self-described 
think tank, which is said to be funded by international arbitration firms and 
their clients, the European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration 
(EFILA), which sprung up in 2014 with the sole purpose of blocking serious 
reform of investment arbitration.197 Investment treaty reforms should always 
tilt in the direction of protecting investor rights after all, they write, the main 
purpose of investment agreements is to protect rights.198 This is worrying to 
say the least as those responsible for defining and expanding the field of 
investment arbitration seem to have pre-conceived notions.199 However on the 
other side, Behn argues that the uneven distribution of claimants and 
respondents has led to the perception that investment treaty arbitration is 
biased in favour of large companies from developed states against the less 
powerful developing states hosting their investments.200 This might seem to 
be the case but a valid case of bias has been made, as the pool of arbitrators 
is often made of the same lawyers from international law firms who act as 
both parties in different instances.201 
 
This leads to the third issue which does not affect all of the respondents as it 
is an epidemic of developing nations or rather the lack of representation of 
developing nations’ own candidates as arbitrators. The list of arbitrators is 
made up of 68 per cent of arbitrators from Western Europe and North America 
and only 2 per cent from Sub Saharan Africa.202 The majority have no notion 
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of the developmental issues that plague developing countries.203 To entrust 
public policy issues and decisions of sovereigns to a tribunal that more often 
than not consists of three white males that are of western origin is 
disheartening. The rigid views and political bias is inherent as the panel has 
no notion of the developmental issues and is likely to reach a decision in 
favour of the investor with high damages award to the detriment of the poor 
of the developing nation.204  
 
This is unsustainable and has caused uproar but the voice of the developing 
nations is not so powerful. It is interesting to note that the shoe is now falling 
on the other foot as developed countries are now starting to feel the pinch of 
adverse investment arbitral awards. Until now investment treaties have been 
reciprocal only in theory and not in fact, leading to mostly developing 
countries being the respondent in investment disputes.205 
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3.3.2.4. FORUM SHOPPING 
 
This section examines issues related to forum shopping and multiple and 
parallel proceedings which causes the multiplicity of proceedings. As a result 
of the larger number of BITs currently in place, and the increasing of 
production and investment, investors seeking to pursue claims for damages 
often have a choice of fora. This is through different arbitration regimes or of 
arbitration or a national court. Corporations are reported to begin structuring 
their transactions in such a way as to be able to benefit from the provisions 
of different BITs. Investors are sometimes able to claim breaches of different 
BITs and to seek relief through different arbitration proceedings under each 
of the invoked treaties in respect of a single investment and regarding the 
same facts, which could lead to parallel proceedings and potentially 
conflicting awards. This result is due to the fact that many, if not most BITS, 
protect not only investments made by nationals, individuals and corporations 
of one state directly into the other state, but also investments made indirectly 
through a company established in one party but controlled by an investor in 
a non-party. Investors who are minority shareholders may be able to bring 
claims too. A particular company may have minority shareholders of various 
nationalities. Hence, the host state may face multiple arbitrations under 
different BITs in relation to essentially the same set of facts.206 
 
The process throughout which one of the parties to a dispute attempts to 
bring a claim before the forum most advantageous to him or her is referred to 
as “forum shopping”.207 In the case of investment arbitration, forum shopping 
has a different meaning and application. On the one hand, the foreign investor 
is directed by the investment treaty to a specific arbitration option or set of 
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options, i.e. local courts, ICISD arbitration or ad hoc arbitration. This is 
evidenced by the Biwater case mentioned above. This creates an opportunity 
for forum shopping very different from the traditional private international law 
one. On the other hand, a foreign investor and related parties may engage in 
forum shopping in combination with treaty shopping, to enlarge the choice of 
forum beyond the options provided by the specific BIT, or even to bring the 
same facts into parallel or multiple proceedings.208 The most graphic 
examples of this phenomenon are the CME/Lauder v. the Czech Republic 
cases. There are inherent consequences to this issue which include 
inconsistent decisions and the cost of multiplicity of proceedings.209  
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3.4. ISSUES THAT AFFECT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
 
As the major net importers of global capital, developing nations have borne 
the brunt of defending the growing number of investment treaty claims.210 
Together with developmental issues that they face, there are additional issues 
that they face with the current investment dispute settlement system. 
 
3.4.1. EXPERTISE 
Financial and administrative barriers which plague the majority of developing 
nations hinder them from properly defending investment claims. On top of 
that they also do not have the legal expertise within their government service 
to defend investment treaty claims. As a consequence, most developing 
nations are forced to hire one of a handful of international law firms who 
charge the same premium market rates that wealthy individual investors and 
corporations pay for their services.211 Meanwhile, developing nations who 
cannot hire outside counsel are left to contend with scattered and incomplete 
legal resources with no organised legal assistance from the international 
community.212 When faced with overwhelming challenges nations are forced 
to hire lawyers. A cursory glance at published awards will show how most 
governments are represented by their attorney general together with an 
international law firm. For example in the ICSID case Border Timbers Limited 
and Others v. Zimbabwe, the country was represented by the attorney general 
and a Parisian law firm Kimbrough & Associates.213 This leads to the next 
issue of cost of proceedings.  
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3.4.2. COSTS 
Research by the OECD indicates that the average legal and arbitration costs 
are around US$8 million per case.214 The largest cost component is the 
expense incurred by each party for their own legal counsel and experts (about 
82  per cent of the cost of an ISDS case). Arbitrator fees average about 16 per 
cent of costs and institutional costs payable to organisations that administer 
the arbitration and provide secretariat are low, generally amounting to about 
2 per cent of the costs.215 
 
Defending investment claims poses a number of challenges for developing 
nations, including the cost of proceedings. There is also the possibility of a 
large adverse award, coupled together with the regulatory chill which hinders 
a state’s freedom to regulate.216 Currently the Zimbabwean government is in 
breach of an award issued against it by ICSID to the tune of US$230 million 
and legal costs awarded in the amount of US$10.7 million together with 
US$53,000 in experts’ fees.217 Trying to achieve a balance with a Gross 
Domestic Product per capita of US$ 908.80 is a stark example of the 
developmental issues African states face.218 The wave of investor lawsuits has 
far-reaching implications for developing nations' freedom to regulate in the 
public interest. Investors have turned to investment treaty arbitration to 
challenge a wide variety of government measures in a number of sensitive 
areas.219 
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An emerging and disturbing trend is developing, that of third party financing.  
By involving a funder, the claimant may attract the necessary resources and 
expertise in litigating or arbitrating the claim. In return, the funder is 
promised a part of the proceeds if the claim is successful.220  
The motivation was the high value of arbitration claims, the perceived finality 
of awards, and the relative ease of enforcement of awards.221 Such ‘third-party 
funding’ of ISDS claims has been expanding quickly as financing such claims 
has proven to be very lucrative. Third-party financing reduces litigation costs 
to the corporations themselves, making it easier, and thus encouraging them 
to sue. Foreign corporations typically do not have to declare receiving third-
party funding for an ISDS case. Not surprisingly then, the ISDS claims-
financing industry is booming as different types of investors have been 
attracted by and drawn into financing lawsuits, treating ISDS claims as 
speculative assets.222 
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3.5. THE PROFFERED SOLUTIONS 
 
Legitimacy depends in large part upon factors such as determinacy and 
coherence, which can in turn produce predictability and reliability. Related 
concepts such as justice, fairness, accountability, representation, correct use 
of procedure, and opportunities for review also impact on conceptions of 
legitimacy.223 When these factors are absent investors and governments 
cannot anticipate how to comply with the law and plan their conduct 
accordingly, thereby undermining legitimacy. There are two possible 
approaches to the issues faced in investment arbitration. The first approach 
is evolutionary: investment treaty arbitration is experiencing adolescent 
“growing pains,” but its overall structure is sound and many of the particular 
legitimacy challenges facing this system of adjudication can be resolved over 
time.224 The second approach is revolutionary: investment treaty arbitration 
is off the rails and its overall structure is so deeply flawed that no tweaks or 
reforms to the system can correct its fundamental legitimacy deficits.225 
 
There are problems with the current system, with the application of the BIT 
standards equally for all countries. One solution that has been posed is the 
adoption of contextual standards. These contextual standards entail creating 
a more equitable system that prevents investors from getting an unfair 
windfall, built on the economic inequalities that justify the application of the 
differentiation principle to developing countries.226 Outside of international 
investment law, contextual and differential standards are used to create 
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greater equity in international agreements. This need for equitable treatment 
is justified by two realities. First, in addition to any international obligations, 
developing countries face extremely pressing issues such as severe poverty 
and a dire need to raise their standard of living.227 Second, developing 
countries have less capacity to comply with strict substantive obligations 
under international law. This inability stems from various factors: a lack of 
capital and other resources; a lack of technological experience to develop, 
implement, and monitor new projects; legislative drafting inexperience; a lack 
of regulatory or administrative expertise to implement laws; and a population 
that is primarily concerned with its standard of living.228 This was 
demonstrated in the Schlaefer case against the government of South Africa. A 
private Swiss investor invoked the terms of the Swiss-South Africa BIT, where 
he alleged that the government had failed to provide the requisite standard of 
protection. He had experienced poaching theft and vandalism at his game 
reserve. The presiding tribunal held the government liable for failing to provide 
protection and security as envisaged in the BIT.229 This is a clear lack of 
comprehension of the plight of the country, South Africa experiences poaching 
and theft at very high rates. The standard of protection envisaged by 
international law is too high for developing countries that are prone to 
incidents of theft and vandalism. International agreements with contextual or 
differential standards reflect the principle that states with varied resources 
and capabilities should be subject to equally varied and equitable 
requirements and obligations.230 Adopting contextual standards in BITs 
would acknowledge that while developing countries need foreign investment, 
they also have critical priorities outside of a specific BIT that may affect their 
ability to undertake extensive investment obligations. Contextual standards 
would also recognize that when developing countries do take on investment 
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obligations, they will have greater difficulty in complying because of a lack of 
development in various areas.231 
African governments are attempting to move to sustainable development, this 
is reflected in regional investment agreements which will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4. This transformational objective requires legal frameworks 
that harness the flow of foreign direct investment. Currently IIAs are 
structured in a manner which restricts the policy space of states. The 
international investment regime as it stands shows bias towards the investor, 
over a state’s right to regulate in the public interest. What is required is an 
afro-centric investment protection framework to achieve appropriate balance. 
This could possibly be complemented by an African based investment 
center.232 
 
3.5.1. MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT 
 
Various authors have suggested that a MAI would address all of the issues 
currently affecting the investment regime.233 The content of an MAI is 
relatively easy to outline because of the many existing treaties with investment 
protection. One source is the numerous, rather similar BITs. Another source 
is the investment chapters in FTAs, notably the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). A third source is the lengthy draft MAI negotiated by the 
OECD (1998).234 Although it would be relatively easy to draft an agreement, it 
is the agreement of the parties that would be difficult. The failure of the OECD 
                                                          
231 Alexander EA ‘Taking Account of Reality: Adopting Contextual Standards for Developing Countries in 
International Investment Law’ Virginia journal of international law 830. 
232 Carim X ‘International investment agreements and Africa’s structural transformation: A perspective from 
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draft MAI is a fair indication that states do not take investment agreements 
lightly, they would still like the autonomy to be able to decide how investments 
are conducted in their territories. 
Dispute settlement falls into two categories, state-state procedures and 
investor-state procedures, and is the most complicated and controversial 
issue. There is no commonly agreed system for dispute resolution but multiple 
alternatives exist. Two-thirds are handled by ICSID and its additional facility. 
Other arbitration alternatives are the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, the International Chamber of 
Commerce, or ad hoc resolution.235 A unified system of dispute settlement 
would most certainly go a long way to creating consistent standards of 
investment law and precedent, making the system more legitimate.  
 
3.5.2. CONSISTENCY 
 
There is no coherent system for addressing inconsistencies across the 
investment treaty network and there is no uniform mechanism to correct 
inconsistent decisions. A patchwork of mechanisms was inherited from 
international commercial arbitration, but these neither permit review of the 
merits nor correction of legal errors. Instead, there are narrow options to 
review awards to address procedural deficiencies. One of the main advantages 
for the creation of an appellate mechanism advanced by its proponents is 
consistency.236 Consistency and coherence of jurisprudence create 
predictability and enhance the legitimacy of the system of investment 
arbitration. The inconsistent decisions based on the same or similar facts 
rendered for instance in the CME v Czech Republic and Lauder v Czech 
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Republic cases have attracted widespread attention.237 There is no guarantee 
that the inconsistencies would have been avoided, if these awards had been 
submitted subsequently to an appeal. The chances for consistency 
would however be reinforced by the existence of a common appeals body 
which would handle not only ICSID awards, but also awards rendered by 
other ad hoc arbitral tribunals. The notion of consistency has been viewed to 
go beyond the situation when two panels constituted under different 
agreements deal with the same set of facts and give conflicting opinions or 
reach a different conclusion.238 It might also encompass coherence of 
interpretation of basic principles which may underlie differently worded 
provisions in particular agreements and therefore might enhance the 
development of a more consistent international investment law.239 The 
development of consistent international legal principles needs to be balanced 
by respect for the intent of the parties to specific agreements. Even where the 
intent of the countries may differ in some respects in relation to similar 
provisions in their investment agreements, it was argued that, there is value 
in encouraging consistency in interpretation across the agreements of a 
particular country or countries where the intent of the parties do not differ.240 
The UNCITRAL Rules, the ICSID Convention, and the Additional Facility 
Rules, do not have any provision allowing for consolidation of claims. 
However, there have been some recent cases filed at ICSID in which the 
parties agreed to have their claims against a particular state consolidated. In 
order to avoid inconsistencies in the findings of different tribunals, parties 
could also appoint the same arbitrators.241 
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3.5.3. APPELLATE MECHANSM 
An appellate mechanism could provide a more uniform and coherent means 
for challenging awards.242 It would provide for rectification of legal errors and 
possibly serious errors of fact. Another possible advantage is to dispel public 
concern that awards affecting important public policy issues and interests 
could be enforced despite serious error.243 This could enhance support for 
investor-state arbitration at a time of growing numbers of cases. One set 
suggests building an internal review mechanism in each investment treaty so 
that an institution, such as a regional tribunal on investment, can issue 
interpretive guidance. Another group recommends the establishment of an 
independent appellate body to review the awards of arbitral tribunals.244 
 
One survey has noted that binding arbitration has reached its “tipping 
point”.245 It is also noteworthy that the settlement rate of investor-state 
disputes at ICSID before any final award is rendered is estimated 
approximately at 30 per cent-40 per cent percent. It points in the direction 
that there is a good prospect of investor-state dispute settlement by mediation 
which needs to be explored further. In response to the growing desire to switch 
alternative dispute resolution, namely mediation, well-known institutions 
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such as the OECD and the International bar association have taken the 
initiative to propagate such an alternative.246 
 
3.6. LESSONS TO BE DRAWN FROM CETA 
"With our proposals for a new Investment Court System, we are 
breaking new ground. The new Investment Court System will be 
composed of fully qualified judges, proceedings will be transparent, and 
cases will be decided on the basis of clear rules. In addition, the Court 
will be subject to review by a new Appeal Tribunal. With this new 
system, we protect the governments' right to regulate, and ensure that 
investment disputes will be adjudicated in full accordance with the rule 
of law."247  
These were the words of First Vice-President Frans Timmermans on the 
proposal for an investment court system in the CETA negotiation. 
 
Now the investment court system, despite criticism is firmly embedded in the 
EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement CETA of 2016.248 
It stems from an investment chapter fully dedicated to the establishment of 
an investment court system. The establishment of this court system basically 
addresses all the current issues facing the investment dispute settlement 
regime. The approach in CETA institutionalises the resolution of investment 
disputes and foresees that disputes be solved by a Tribunal of first Instance 
and an appeal tribunal to review possible errors of law. Under this approach, 
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both instances are composed of Tribunal Members appointed by the two trade 
agreement partners, with the objective of increasing the legitimacy, 
effectiveness and independence of the dispute settlement system.249 
From the outset CETA establishes parties’ right to regulate; the preamble 
reaffirms and states that the right to regulate is protected.250 This echoes the 
regional African investment instruments, which will be discussed fully in 
Chapter 4. Art. 8.9 (1) merely ‘reaffirms’ this already existing balance. The 
following paragraph offers some improvement, but it cannot properly be 
construed as a carve out for decision making in the public interest. The 
formulation of this article is declarative and not legally enforceable. It is 
merely a guideline for arbitrators. Contrary to public statements by the 
parties, these provisions therefore fail to effectively limit claims that challenge 
public policy measures. To protect the right to regulate, the parties should 
have introduced a carve out or a binding principle to guide interpretation.251  
 
The investment chapter seeks to address one of the core criticisms of ISDS - 
the lack of independence and bias towards investors of ISDS arbitrators. This 
is done by altering the selection process of CETA tribunal members. Tribunal 
members will be randomly selected from a roster of 15 individuals, appointed 
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by the CETA Joint Committee.252 The selection process is a step in the right 
direction however CETA still does not guarantee sufficient independence 
because tribunal members are still incentivised and the selection system is 
not transparent leaving a lot to be desired.253  
 
One of the most important aspects of this agreement was the introduction of 
an appellate mechanism which was exuberantly welcomed.254 However 
missing in the agreement is this appellate mechanism’s overall functioning 
and procedures, appointment of members or their remuneration. The 
mechanism is heralded for increasing the legitimacy of the system, yet these 
fundamental elements are yet to be defined by the CETA Joint Committee.255  
The chapter also contains considerable improvements on transparency. It is 
based on, and goes further than the UNCITRAL transparency rules. Hearings, 
exhibits and submissions would be made available to the public, and civil 
society stakeholders can make amicus curiae submissions.256 However, CETA 
does not offer possibilities for third party intervention. Rights and 
mechanisms for third-party intervention are vital for local populations, who 
are directly affected in cases relating to environmental permits for mining or 
infrastructure projects.257 
                                                          
252 Articles 8.27, 8.28 & 8.30 of CETA 2016. 
253 Joint analysis of CETA’s Investment Court System (ICS) Prioritising Private Investment over Public Interest 
available at http://epha.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Joint-Analysis-CETA-ICS-1.pdf  (accessed 1 May 
2017).  
254 Article 8.28 of CETA 2016. 
255 Joint analysis of CETA’s Investment Court System (ICS) Prioritising Private Investment over Public Interest 
available at http://epha.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Joint-Analysis-CETA-ICS-1.pdf (accessed 1 May 
2017). 
256 Article 8.36 of CETA 2016; the Biwater Tribunal was the first ICSID Tribunal to permit amicus participation 
under the new Rules. The Tribunal’s extensive discussion of the points raised by the amici, and its reference to 
the usefulness of the amicus submission, affirmed the active role amici are expected to play in investment 
arbitration, and vested third-party participation with additional institutional legitimacy (beyond that conferred 
by the Rules themselves). Notably, in this instance, the amici did not confine themselves to broad policy 
considerations, as the Tribunal’s initial decision to allow their participation suggested. Rather, they addressed 
several substantive issues, including, inter alia, the possibility that BGT’s bid for the project was artificially (and 
unsustainably) low with an eye to renegotiation at some future point. 
257 Joint analysis of CETA’s Investment Court System (ICS) Prioritising Private Investment over Public Interest 
available at http://epha.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Joint-Analysis-CETA-ICS-1.pdf (accessed 1 May 
2017). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
85 
 
It can be gleaned from CETA that it would seem to address all the major issues 
currently plaguing the international investment dispute resolution regime. 
The establishment of a permanent court with independent arbitrators is the 
beginning of precedent in investment law. Although the CETA tribunal is said 
to have its drawbacks such as giving a lot of discretion to the joint interpretive 
committee to decide on issues that should be clearly defined in the agreement 
such as the appeal mechanism leaves a lot to be desired. However, it is a step 
in the right direction and what remains to be seen is the actual functioning of 
the court, where many lessons could be drawn from. 
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3.7. CONCLUSION  
 
Even if treaties can be rescinded on relatively short notice, established 
investments continue to take advantage of treaty protections for ten to fifteen 
years, on average, into the future. Even denunciations of the international 
convention governing investment disputes (ICSID) will not have quite the 
desired effect for established investments. Such methods, Schreuer writes, 
are not likely to give rise to “quick and decisive results.”258 However this is a 
step in the right direction as perceived by the South African Department of 
Trade and Industry which, in a reaction to adverse arbitral decisions 
undertook a wholesale review of its BIT framework, observing that the current 
model of investment treaty, borrowed from the United Kingdom, did not serve 
well South Africa’s constitutional project of societal reconciliation in the face 
of apartheid’s legacy of economic inequality.259 
One suggestion has been the incorporation of an investment advisory centre 
as a permanent institution, fashioned after the WTO advisory centre;260 it 
would go a long way in assisting developing nations. CETA represents an 
important and radical change in investment rules and dispute resolution. It 
lays the basis for a multilateral effort to develop further this new approach to 
investment dispute resolution into a Multilateral Investment Court. This is an 
improvement and shows that some institutions are making headway in an 
attempt to legitimise the investment dispute regime. With institutions like the 
ICC already responding to the issue of costs, the latest amendment to the ICC 
arbitration rules deals largely with expediency and costs, it is indeed a step 
in the right direction.261  
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The issues faced by developing countries more so African nations are unique. 
The sentiments echoed in African regional investment instruments mirror 
those developed by CETA. However, they continue to sign BITs, which 
contradict the inter-African instruments on investment, despite the fact that 
the instruments may only apply on a regional level. There are many issues 
which need to be considered when addressing issues in investment dispute 
settlement for African nations. As stated above they suffer untenable bias at 
the hands of arbitrators, of which tribunals are made up mostly of European 
and American white males. For a multilateral investment court system to 
work for African nations it must be a solution that addresses the concerns 
facing these states. Therefore, contextual and differential standards all 
recognize the vast differences that currently exist between countries and the 
effect that these differences have on countries' priorities and capabilities.262 
The current blanket application of the law in investment tribunals does not 
achieve a fair result as developing countries are subject to differential 
treatment in most other aspects in international law except for investment 
law. Under contextual standards, the realities of an individual country will 
determine the expectations of full protection and security, fair and equitable 
treatment, and other substantive obligations. The requirements of 
international investment law will thus be based on a sliding scale. More 
developed countries with greater capacity to protect investments will be held 
to a higher standard. Conversely, a developing country less capable of 
providing protection will have its behaviour judged against a standard based 
on its own development.263 A thorough examination of the existing African 
regional investment instruments will be done in the next chapter to reflect the 
sentiments of African nations. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT REGIME IN 
AFRICA 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION  
 
It has been proved in the preceding chapters that African nations had no 
control over the resultant investment dispute settlement regime. It was in 
essence a system imposed and consequently inherited from their colonial 
masters. As the foundational assumption that BITs would improve the 
developing world’s ability to attract foreign investment has increasingly come 
under scrutiny and a critical mass of investment treaty arbitration decisions 
and awards became publicly available for review, critical inquiries about the 
legitimacy of the system as a whole began to emerge.264 The historical record 
on the formation of ICSID is unambiguous and suggests that the participating 
African nations overwhelmingly believed that a reputable international 
dispute settlement mechanism would alleviate Africa’s problem of attracting 
foreign investment.265 Investment in Africa has largely been governed by BITs, 
with over 900 agreements in force. Between 1972 and 2014, Africa has been 
recorded as participating in 111 cases representing about one fifth of all those 
documented, which are treaty-based.266 In all, 68 cases have resulted in an 
award, have been settled or have been discontinued and are considered 
concluded, while 43 cases are pending, some dating as far back as 2004. 267 
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 However African regional groupings have their own set of investment 
instruments which represents a true reflection of their interests. These 
instruments consist of rules on the treatment and protection of foreign direct 
investment contributions to the investment climate.268 Some regions include 
voluntary principles while other regions include rules with effective state to 
state dispute settlement mechanisms. The important point is that a 
distinction is made between investment provisions in regional treaties and 
domestic laws.269 The provisions may at times apply to both regional and 
extra-regional investors.270 The overriding role of dispute settlement bodies in 
regional integration initiatives is to foster predictability, transparency, 
accountability and participation of all member states as well as individuals 
conducting business in them.271 
 
 
This chapter will examine the current investment instruments contained in 
the regional groupings with focus on the dispute settlement mechanisms 
therein. There will be particular focus on legal framework such as the SADC 
FIP, the Pan African Investment Code (PAIC) and COMESA, as these are the 
instruments that have direct influence on the Tripartite Free Trade Area 
(TFTA) and the subsequent Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA). An analysis 
of the COMESA Investment Dispute Settlement system will be provided to 
highlight the issues faced in Africa.  
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4.2. THE AFRICAN UNION 
 
Currently the African Union (AU) has no instrument that addresses 
investment directly. However article 19 of the AU Constitutive Act provides for 
three specific financial organs to be created, the African Central Bank, African 
Investment Bank and African Monetary Fund.272 The role of these institutions 
is to implement the economic integration called for in the 1991 Treaty 
Establishing the African Economic Community. The AU is yet to materialise 
the above named institutions, however the AU has started drafting the 
Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA), which is likely to include an investment 
chapter.  
It is encouraging that the AU is undergoing institutional reform. This provides 
an opportunity for member states to determine how the AU can be reformed 
so that the CFTA can be better institutionalized and implemented.273 
Cognisance is taken of the myriad of regional investment agreements that 
have emerged in the African context due to the proliferation of regional 
economic communities (RECs).274 Within West Africa, there are three RECs: 
the West African Economic and Monetary Union, the Mano River Union, and 
the Economic Community of West African States.275 Central Africa has two 
groupings: the Economic Community of Central African States, the Economic 
and Monetary Community of Central Africa, and the Economic Community of 
Great Lakes Countries.276 In the Eastern and Southern African sub-regions, 
six groupings coexist: the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development, the Indian Ocean Commission, the Southern 
Africa Development Community (SADC), and the Southern African Customs 
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Union.277 North Africa shares two RECs, namely the Arab Maghreb Union and 
the Community of Sahel-Saharan States.278 
 
Today, in this complex mosaic, 28 countries retain dual membership, 20 are 
members of three RECs, the Democratic Republic of Congo belongs to four 
RECs, and six countries maintain single membership.279 Focus will be on the 
PAIC as the proposed guiding instrument for the region as a whole, as it is 
likely to be included as the investment chapter in the CFTA280 Secondly an 
analysis of the TFTA as the instrument leading into the CFTA and one that 
merges different regional economic groupings. COMESA, EAC and SADC will 
also be assessed as the regional economic groupings that have come together 
for the TFTA. 
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279 Mbengue M ‘The quest for a Pan-African Investment Code to promote sustainable development’ ICSTD 
Bridges Africa volume 5, issue 12. 
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4.2.1.1. THE CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA 
 
The purpose of the CFTA is to create a free trade area among the member 
States of the AU.281 Following the launching of negotiations for a CFTA by the 
AU summit in June 2015, negotiations are planned for two phases: the first, 
expected to be concluded by the end of 2017, covering trade in goods and 
trade in services; the second will deal with the issues of investment, 
intellectual property rights, and competition policy.282 It has been suggested 
at the recent conference hosted by the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa (UNECA) that the PAIC will form the investment chapter of the 
CFTA.283 
 
The PAIC has been facilitated by UNECA.284 The overarching objective of the 
PAIC is to achieve growth that is more inclusive and widespread through 
promotion and protection of investments, leading not just to equality of 
treatment and opportunity for investors, but also to reduction of investment 
and trade barriers.285 
It has been suggested that some member states might wish to set up a totally 
independent institution for the CFTA, such as a specialized agency of the AU, 
which would have an entirely separate legal personality but could be governed 
through the AU’s policy organs.286 This initiative would ensure proper 
implementation and a more fluid and successful approach. It has also been 
suggested that to give the obligations in the CFTA legal certainty and 
predictability, it will be important to establish a dispute settlement 
mechanism that would be compulsory and binding as well as fast and 
                                                          
281 http://www.uneca.org/aligning-pan-african-investment-code-cfta-2017  (accessed 15 June 2017). 
282 http://www.uneca.org/aligning-pan-african-investment-code-cfta-2017  (accessed 15 June 2017). 
283 http://www.uneca.org/aligning-pan-african-investment-code-cfta-2017  (accessed 15 June 2017).  
284 http://www.uneca.org/aligning-pan-african-investment-code-cfta-2017  (accessed 15 June 2017). 
285 http://www.uneca.org/aligning-pan-african-investment-code-cfta-2017  (accessed 15 June 2017). 
286 Economic Commission for Africa  Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VIII: Bringing the Continental Free 
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efficient.287 Pending the establishment of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights, it has been proposed that the AU Assembly could either 
convene a commercial chamber in the existing African Court of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights or establish a specialist ad hoc committee to hear appeals from 
the decisions of the CFTA Dispute Settlement Committee.288 This is a positive 
step to establish dispute settlement on the continent, however is it is 
disheartening to note that the suggestion is that it be state to state disputes. 
 
 
4.2.1.1.1. The Pan African Investment Code  
 
The preamble of the PAIC states that, it recognises the need for a 
comprehensive guiding instrument on investment for all AU member states.289 
This is a step in the right direction however regional integration in Africa 
remains problematic.290 This is evident in the PAIC which takes note of the 
AU Constitutive Act and its aims towards regional integration.291 Yet in the 
same breath it recognises the right to regulate of member states with a view 
to meeting national policy objectives and to promoting sustainable 
development objectives.292  
 
The PAIC states that it is desirous of creating national and continental 
coherence in investment policymaking while taking into account the existing 
regional agreements on investment and UNCTAD’s Investment Policy 
                                                          
287 Economic Commission for Africa  Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VIII: Bringing the Continental Free 
Trade Area About (2017) 122. 
288 Preamble of the draft Pan African Investment Code. 
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Framework for Sustainable Development.293 While the objective of the PAIC is 
to become a guiding instrument, one cannot fathom how this will be done 
while other regional investment agreements remain in place that may 
contradict the guiding principles.  
 
Article 3 of the PAIC attempts to clarify the position on relationships with 
other investment agreements but there still remains ambiguity. Article 3 
states that the PAIC does not affect the rights and obligations of members 
under other investment agreements.294 Currently there are over 3324 IIAs 
worldwide.295 To date, African countries have signed around 971 IIAs, which 
corresponds to about a third of all IIAs signed worldwide.296 As stated in 
Chapter three, there are already issues with overlapping agreements and the 
myriad of BITS that currently exist, they cause forum shopping and adding to 
that problem will not make dispute settlement easier. 
Article 3(2) endeavours to redeem this by stating that member states may set 
a period in which all BITs will be reviewed and the PAIC can become the 
replacement and binding instrument for all intra-African investment.297It is 
interesting to note that, it states here that it applies to intra-African trade 
agreements yet in the scope of application, it was clearly stated that the PAIC 
applies to investors and their investments in the territory of member 
states.298Chapter 3 of the PAIC recognises developmental needs of the 
respective member states and accordingly makes provision by allowing 
member states to harmonise at their developmental level.299 
                                                          
293 Preamble of the draft Pan African Investment Code. 
294 Article 3(1) of the draft Pan African Investment Code. 
295 World Investment Report 2017 
296http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (accessed 14 June 2017).  
297 Article 3(2) of the draft Pan African Investment Code. 
298 Article 2(1) of the draft Pan African Investment Code. The code defines “investor” as any national, company 
or enterprise of a Member State or a national, company or enterprise from any other country that has invested 
or has made investments in a Member State. 
299Article 18 of the draft Pan African Investment Code states that the process of harmonizing the investment 
regimes among Member States takes place with due respect for national policy objectives and the level of 
development of individual Members States. There shall be appropriate flexibility for Member States to prescribe 
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The PAIC attempts to deal with dispute settlement in chapter 6 but fails to 
address this pertinent issue comprehensively. It begins by encouraging 
member states to handle disputes initially through consultations, negotiation 
or mediation.300 This is a noble call that aligns with UNCTAD’s Investment 
Policy Framework for Sustainable Development.301 State to state arbitration 
has been delegated to established African public forums or alternative dispute 
resolution centres.302 These institutions are not named or defined in the PAIC; 
they are left for the parties to decide. It is only if parties are in dispute over 
this clause that they can refer the matter to the African Court of Justice (ACJ), 
which does not actually exist.303 Dispute settlement remains a contentious 
issue which needs to be clearly defined. The fact that the ACJ is not in 
existence and that the current judicial organ of the AU deals specifically with 
human rights abuses compounds the problem. This is a highly contentious 
issue and is likely to be the basis of claims contesting the jurisdiction of the 
court. The EAC in 2015 had similar issues with their East African court of 
justice; however they rectified the issue by signing a protocol to cover trade 
and investment matters.304  
 
The PAIC also provides for ISDS, however it must be in line with the member 
state’s domestic policies and there must be consent from the state party.305 
The PAIC attempts not to interfere with existing IIAs but stating that disputes 
                                                          
their national List of scheduled investment sectors open for liberalization, in line with their development 
situation.  
300 Article 41 of the draft Pan African Investment Code. 
301 UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, 
302 Article 41(1) of the draft Pan African Investment Code. 
303 Article 41(2) of the draft Pan African Investment Code; The African Court of Justice was originally intended to 
be the “principal judicial organ of the Union” (Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, Article 2.2) 
with authority to rule on disputes over interpretation of AU treaties. A protocol to set up the Court of Justice 
was adopted in 2003, and entered into force in 2009. It was, however, superseded by a protocol creating the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights , which will incorporate the already established African Court on 
Human and Peoples' Rights and have two chambers — one for general legal matters and one for rulings on the 
human rights treaties. 
304 Mwanza W ‘The East African Court’s jurisdiction over investments matters and what it means for 
Community’s legal instruments’ March 2015, available at http://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/7126-the-
eac-court-s-jurisdiction-over-investment-matters-and-what-it-means-for-the-community-s-legal-
instruments.htmlnad (accessed 13 June 2017). 
305 Article 42(1) of the draft Pan African Investment Code. 
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arising under specific agreements shall be governed by the existing 
agreements.306 The PAIC encourages non-binding alternative dispute 
settlement mechanisms in the first six months of a dispute arising.307 Should 
the consultations fail the dispute may be resolved through arbitration, subject 
to the applicable laws of the host State and subject to exhaustion of local 
remedies.308  The PAIC reverts back to the customary international law 
position where domestic remedies had to be exhausted before proceeding to 
an international tribunal. Where ISDS proceeds it may be conducted at any 
established African public or African private alternative dispute resolution 
centre such as the KIAC. Arbitration shall be governed by the UNCITRAL 
rules. 309  The parties are left to decide which centre is to deal with the matter 
and once a place is chosen it is final and the decision shall be binding. This 
is encouraging as the PAIC at least aims to strengthen arbitral institutions 
within the continent. 
 
This code fails to address relevant issues that are currently faced with 
investment dispute settlement. There is no appeal mechanism because the 
arbitration is not specific to any centre, however as a way forward the PAIC 
provides for counterclaims.310 The fact that there is no designated body to 
deal with the disputes will only compound the issue of inconsistent decisions. 
However, the PAIC is not to be fully discredited as it has not yet been signed, 
there is still room for improvement.  
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4.2.2.THE TRIPATITE FREE TRADE AREA 
 
The TFTA was launched in June 2015 and will come into force once 
ratification is attained in two thirds of the 26 member states of COMESA, 
SADC and the EAC. Negotiations on investment are scheduled to take place 
in the second phase of the negotiations, together with trade in services, 
competition policy and intellectual property rights.311 
The notable clause in the TFTA is on dispute settlement as it establishes a 
dispute settlement body (DSB) to address issues pertaining to the agreement.  
It is still unclear whether this dispute settlement body will have jurisdiction 
over investment clauses which are still to be drafted and whether individuals 
will have locus standi. The TFTA DSB is fashioned after the World Trade 
Organisation DSB; in the same manner it can establish a Panel and Appellate 
Body.312  
When the investment chapter is negotiated in the TFTA, this creates an 
opportunity for the replacement of 47 BITs in existence between African 
country members of the three groups.313 Along similar lines, if investment 
protection provisions are included in the European Union economic 
partnership agreements on-going negotiations with regional African groups, 
this may potentially supersede 224 BITs between EU member states and 
individual African countries. This would represent an opportunity to phase 
out 81 per cent of the total number of BITs signed by COMESA countries.314 
 
                                                          
311 Hartzenberg  T ‘Introduction’ in Trudi Hartzenberg et al Cape to Cairo: Making the Tripartite Free Trade Area 
Work (2011) iii. 
312 Article 30 (2) of the Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement, 2015. 
313 COMESA Investment Report 2013 
314 Such an approach is already envisaged in the EU context, where Regulation 1219/2012, adopted in December 
2012, sets out a transitional arrangement for BITs between EU Member States and third countries. Article 3 of 
the Regulation stipulates that “without prejudice to other obligations of the Member States under Union law, 
bilateral investment agreements notified pursuant to article 2 of this Regulation may be maintained in force, or 
enter into force, in accordance with the [Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union] and this Regulation, 
until a bilateral investment agreement between the Union and the same third country enters into force.” 
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4.2.3.COMESA 
 
The Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA), established 
in 1981, became COMESA in 1993 in line with Article 29 of the PTA itself 
which called for the development of the PTA into a common market and 
eventually into an economic community.315 COMESA was established 
primarily as a vehicle for trade and economic development, and its objectives 
are economically orientated.316 It is interesting to note that one of the key 
objectives is to contribute towards the establishment, progress and the 
realisation of the objectives of the African Economic Community.317It is 
evident that the overall integration strategy of the African continent is 
important to COMESA members. 
 
4.2.3.1. THE COMESA COURT OF JUSTICE 
 
Article 7 establishes the COMESA Court of Justice (COJ) as one of the arms 
of COMESA, while article 19 affirms adherence to law in the interpretation 
and application of the COMESA Treaty.318 The COJ is composed of seven 
judges appointed by the Authority, and whose function is to adjudicate on all 
matters referred to it pursuant to the COMESA Treaty.319Independence and 
impartiality are the highlighted features for qualification as a judge together 
with competence in their respective countries.320 It is interesting to note that 
                                                          
315 Preamble to the COMESA Treaty 
316 Article 3 of the COMESA Treaty. 
317 Article 3(f) of the COMESA Treaty. When COMESA was established, its main priority was the creation of a FTA 
by 2000, and this was achieved. In 2009, the COMESA Heads of State launched the COMESA Customs Union but 
this has yet to enter into force. 
318 Article 19 of the COMESA Treaty. 
319 Article 20(1) of the COMESA Treaty. 
320 Article 20(2) of the COMESA Treaty. 
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no more than two judges shall be nationals of the same member state.321 This 
may be in order to retain independence of the COJ and to ensure there is no 
bias. The COJ is financed by the member states.322Tenure is granted for five 
years and judges are eligible for reappointment for a second term.323 The 
judges are immune from legal action arising from the discharge of their 
duties.324 
The COJ is granted exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising in and out of 
the COMESA Treaty.325 In addition, the court has jurisdiction to give advisory 
opinions regarding questions of law relating to the Treaty.326 Disputes 
between COMESA employees and the Authority may also be heard by the 
court. 
 
Article 24 regulates state to state disputes, whereby member states that 
consider that the treaty has been breached by another member state of may 
refer the matter to the court.327 In addition to this protection, member states 
may challenge any act or directive by the council that amounts to an 
infringement of the treaty or abuse of power.328 The Secretary General is 
empowered to submit his findings to a member state on its failure to fulfil an 
obligation of the treaty.329 The matter may be escalated to the Bureau of the 
Council which shall decide whether the matter is to be referred to the court 
or to the council.330 Failing which the council may direct the Secretary 
General to refer the matter to the court for determination.331 
 
                                                          
321 Article 20(2) of the COMESA Treaty. 
322 Article 42 of the COMESA Treaty. 
323 Article 21(1) of the COMESA Treaty. 
324 Article 39 of the COMESA Treaty. 
325 Article 23 of the COMESA Treaty. 
326 Article 32 of the COMESA Treaty. 
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The jurisdiction of the COJ extends to natural persons resident in any of the 
member states, who may refer for determination any act or directive by the 
council or a member state.332 This is significant power given to individuals 
however it is limited by the fact that local remedies must have been 
exhausted. Once again an instrument reverts to the customary law position. 
This provision seems to exclude investors that are not from any of the member 
states. The COJ has extensive jurisdiction which includes arbitration in which 
the COJ has been chosen as a tribunal.333 
 
Third parties are permitted to make submissions with leave of the court.334All 
judgements of the COJ can only be revised if it is based upon the discovery of 
some fact which by its nature might have had a decisive influence on the 
judgment if it had been known to the Court at the time the judgment was 
given.335 Enforcement of pecuniary obligations is subject to the rules of 
procedure of the member state.336 The court is empowered to prescribe 
sanctions member states that have defaulted in implementing its decision.337 
Decisions of the court have precedence over those of national courts of 
Member states.338 The seat of the COJ is in Khartoum, Sudan, which may not 
have the capacity to handle disputes given the current state of affairs in this 
conflict zone. 
 
 
 
                                                          
332 Article 26 of the COMESA Treaty 
333 Article 28 of the COMESA Treaty. 
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4.2.3.2. COMESA INVESTMENT AGREEMENT 
 
On 22 and 23 of May 2007 the twelfth Summit of COMESA Authority of Heads 
of State and Government, held in Nairobi, Kenya, adopted the Investment 
Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area (CCIA Agreement). 
According to COMESA, “the CCIA Agreement is a precious investment tool 
whereby the COMESA Secretariat contemplates to create a stable region and 
good investment environment, promote cross border investments and protect 
investment, and thus enhance COMESA’s attractiveness and competitiveness 
within the COMESA Region, as a destination for Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI), and in which domestic investments are encouraged.”339 
This investment agreement has been said to offer a new approach to ISDS 
that is sensitive to the realities of developing states and of the particular 
conditions that influence approaches to international commercial arbitration 
in Africa.340 The CCIA Agreement represents a challenging new departure; it 
provides a system of investor-state arbitration that seeks to reconcile the 
concerns both of investors, African host countries and other stakeholders in 
the fair and effective resolution of disputes through regional dispute 
settlement mechanisms.341 
 
The CCIA agreement has four parts. The first part details objectives, features, 
issues on transparency, general obligations, on COMESA and international 
multilateral agreements, institutional arrangements, implementation 
programmes and action. The other three parts of the agreement include rights 
and obligations of members and COMESA investors, on dispute settlement, 
                                                          
339 Available at http://www.comesa.int/experts-discuss-revised-ccia/ ( accessed 17 July 2017). 
340Muchlinski, P, The COMESA Common Investment Area: Substantive Standards and Procedural Problems in 
Dispute Settlement (2008). SOAS School of Law Research Paper No. 11/2010. 
341 Muchlinski, P, The COMESA Common Investment Area: Substantive Standards and Procedural Problems in 
Dispute Settlement (2008). SOAS School of Law Research Paper No. 11/2010 12. 
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and a part on final provisions detailing how the CCIA agreement relates to 
other existing agreements, adoption of protocols, additional membership, 
withdrawal and renewal of membership, and ratification of the agreement.  
 
The provisions relevant to dispute settlement show a departure from the 
traditional IIAs. In Article 8 of the CCIA member states are encouraged to 
accede to the New York Convention on recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards, ICSID, MIGA and other multilateral agreements that protect 
investment. This presents a new feature already as member states are called 
on to reinforce investment protection by signing multilateral agreements. 
Although the provision is not peremptory it is surely a step in the right 
direction. The institutions within COMESA responsible for the administration 
of the agreement include the CCIA committee comprising of ministers 
responsible for investment in each member state.342 Member states are tasked 
with submitting an implementation plan within a year of ratifying the 
agreement.343  
 
It must be noted that this agreement only applies to investments of COMESA 
investors that have been specifically registered pursuant to this agreement.344 
It covers only disputes involving claims that have arisen since the entry into 
force of the agreement.345 Consequently the CCIA Agreement has no 
retroactive force and claims arising before its entry into force will have to be 
dealt with by other means.346 
 
  
                                                          
342 Article 7 of the CCIA Agreement 
343 Article 28(3) of the CCIA Agreement. 
344 Article 12 of the CCIA Agreement ;Caveat emptor  
345 Article 12 of the CCIA Agreement 
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4.2.3.2.1. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS UNDER CCIA  
 
The CCIA agreement allows for both state to state dispute settlement and 
ISDS. However before either type of dispute settlement mechanism can be 
invoked the CCIA Agreement demands use of other dispute settlement 
techniques such as negotiation and mediation.347 This provision provides a 
six month ‘cooling off’ period where parties shall seek to resolve matters 
amicably before a formal initiation of the dispute.348 Failure to settle the 
dispute at mediation and negotiation level may result in the member state 
referring the dispute to various fora. The options range from an independent 
arbitral tribunal, to the COJ sitting as a court or as an arbitral tribunal.349 
 
ISDS is limited to COMESA investors, who are also afforded a wide range of 
tribunals to refer disputes to. Forum shopping is specifically prohibited as 
investors are only permitted to bring claims to one of the fora at any given 
time.350 The different fora include the host state’s domestic courts, the 
COMESA COJ, ICSID, and ad hoc arbitration under the various rules.351 
Article 28(4) contains explicit consent to arbitration by member states 
through what is termed ‘arbitration without privity’.352 The host country 
makes an offer to all foreign investors which can be subsequently accepted by 
any investor involved in a dispute with that country, thereby obviating the 
need for a prior arbitration agreement between them.353 The CCIA continues 
to introduce innovations with a transparency provision which allows for 
documents filed to be made available to the public, while also protecting the 
investor’s confidential business information.354 In addition to this, third 
                                                          
347 Article 26(1) of the CCIA Agreement.  
348 Article 26(2) of the CCIA Agreement. 
349 Article 27 of COMESA CCIA.  
350 Article 28(1) of CCIA Agreement. 
351 Article 28(1) of the CCIA Agreement.  
352 Paulson J, ‘Arbitration without privity’ ICSID Review 232. 
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parties particularly amicus curiae are permitted to make submissions subject 
to the discretion of the tribunal.355 Further to that states are permitted to 
counterclaim.356  
The CCIA agreement offers the most radical solutions on investment dispute 
resolution on the continent. It is an instrument that once ratified will provide 
a more balanced approach to investment dispute settlement. It offers to the 
investor the choice of international arbitration based on a balance of rights 
and obligations between them and the respondent state. In this the CCIA 
Agreement can be viewed as a significant response to the concerns of investors 
about local remedies while at the same time structuring the available 
substantive types of claim to ensure that legitimate state rights to regulate 
are not unduly curtailed and that the rights and interests of significant third 
parties are not ignored.357 This agreement essentially addresses the issues 
highlighted in Chapter 3. 
 
While the CCIA presents a far superior investment instrument than any other 
on the continent, its biggest drawback is that it has not yet been ratified. It 
still remains a fossil in the archives of trade departments, and it might have 
been overtaken by events with the probable onset of investment chapters in 
the TFTA and CFTA. However, this agreement can still serve as a guiding 
principle for the drafting of those investment chapters. There are numerous 
aspects that can be drawn from the CCIA to be incorporated into the PAIC 
such as referring matters to African arbitral centres. 
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4.2.4.THE EAC INVESTMENT GUIDE 
 
The East African Community (EAC) is a regional intergovernmental 
organisation of six East African states.358 The Treaty for establishment of the 
EAC was signed on 30 November 1999 and entered into force on 7 July 
2000.359The EAC countries established a customs union in 2005 and common 
market in 2009; they also signed a protocol for a monetary union in 2013.360 
The ultimate mission of the EAC is to widen and deepen economic, political, 
social and cultural integration in order to improve the quality of life of the 
people of East Africa through increased competitiveness, value added 
production, trade and investments.361 
The EAC is in agreement about the need for cooperation in order to spearhead 
investment in the region. The aim is to harness the investment potential to 
promote economic growth and development in the region. The members of the 
EAC agreed to co-operate in the areas of investment and industrial 
development.362 This co-operation seeks to, rationalise investments and make 
full use of established industries. This will in turn promote efficiency in 
production, as well as harmonise and rationalise investment incentives with 
a view to promoting the EAC as a single investment area.363 To this end, an 
EAC Model Investment Code was drafted in 2002.364 The Investment Code is 
not a binding legal instrument but rather a model whose features the EAC 
partner states may incorporate into their national laws. 
                                                          
358 http://www.eac.int/about/overview (accessed 17 June 2017); The five member states of the EAC are 
Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. The Republic of South Sudan was admitted as the sixth 
member of the EAC at the 17th Ordinary Summit of the East African Community Heads of State on 2 March 
2016 in Arusha. 
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Dispute settlement is addressed in article 15 of the Code; it states that 
investment disputes are to be dealt with in terms of domestic laws.365 Yet the 
next article states that parties can submit disputes to ICSID unless they agree 
otherwise.366 Clarke states that this may be contradictory as the alternative 
domestic remedies only exist if parties exclude international arbitration in the 
treaty.367 It is interesting to note that currently Burundi is the only EAC 
member to have modified its legislation to align it with the EAC Investment 
Code.368 However as the instrument remains non-binding and acts merely as 
a guide, a high level of compliance is not to be expected. This EAC code seems 
to have been superseded by the CCIA and ultimately the PAIC. 
The EAC is a REC that has achieved the highest level of integration to date, 
within the continent. Investment falls under the monetary union and this will 
take considerable effort to achieve integration. Hence the EAC investment 
instrument serves as a guide, it is not binding. This approach may be more 
sustainable for African nations who more often than not lack the political will 
to conform their domestic laws. However, it does not provide an appropriate 
structure that instils investor confidence in the system. The most significant 
stride in the EAC is the intention to harmonise and rationalise investments, 
offering the regional bloc as one. This presents a significant departure from 
BITs which promote agreement between two countries. This will significantly 
increase the region’s bargaining power. 
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Making the Tripartite Free Trade Area Work (2011) 82. 
368 Clark V in ‘Investment governance in the Tripartite Free Trade Area’ in Trudi Hartzenberg et al Cape to Cairo: 
Making the Tripartite Free Trade Area Work (2011) 83. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
107 
 
4.2.5.SADC FIP 
 
The SADC Member States amended Annex 1 of the SADC Finance and 
Investment Protocol (FIP) in August 2016. The amended version omits the fair 
and equitable provision and the ISDS mechanism as suggested in the model 
SADC BIT. The amended FIP also refines the definition of investment and 
investors, while still limiting its protection to member state investors. The FIP 
introduces exceptions to the expropriation provision for public policy 
measures. The national treatment provision is clarified with reference to “like 
circumstances”. 369 The FIP includes detailed provisions on investor 
responsibility370 and the right of host countries to regulate investment for the 
public interest.371 These amendments have been ratified as the three quarters 
majority has been reached. What remains are the harmonisation of the 
regional instrument with the domestic laws, the FIP encourages 
harmonisation.372 
 
 
The SADC FIP 2010 included a dispute settlement provision between the 
investor and the state. Article 28 stated that the investor had to exhaust local 
remedies before referring the matter to the listed options. The amendment 
leaves a lot to be desired as it omits to address the contentious issue of dispute 
settlement specifically. The FIP states that all disputes are to be handled in 
terms of the SADC Tribunal Protocol which is yet to be ratified.373 
 
 
                                                          
369Article 6 of the Amended SADC FIP 2016. 
370 Article 8 of the SADC FIP 2016. 
371 Article 12 of the SADC FIP 2016. 
372 Article 17of the SADC FIP 2016. 
373 Article 26 of the SADC FIP 2016. 
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The SADC FIP instead of presenting a radical instrument presents a watered 
down instrument that essentially takes away the protection of investors, with 
the omission of the fair and equitable treatment. This instrument fails to 
achieve a balance between investor and host state, instead it creates a system 
that is skewed in favour of the host state, which may deter investors. 
Especially since South Africa an economic hub in the SADC region has 
already started withdrawing from BITs, this may end up being the prevailing 
law. After stripping the investor of rights, the SADC FIP continues to direct 
disputes to the defunct and non-existent SADC Tribunal, which shall be 
discussed in detail below. 
 
 
4.2.5.1. THE SADC TRIBUNAL  
 
The SADC Tribunal was established to ensure adherence to, and proper 
interpretation of the provisions of, the SADC Treaty and subsidiary 
instruments, and adjudicates upon disputes referred to it.374 It was 
established by the Protocol on the Tribunal, which was signed in Windhoek, 
Namibia during the 2000 Ordinary Summit, and was officially established on 
18 August, 2005 in Gaborone, Botswana. The Tribunal consisted of appointed 
judges from Member States.375 
After several judgements against the Zimbabwean government, the Tribunal 
was de facto suspended at the 2010 SADC Summit.376 On 17 August 2012 in 
                                                          
374 Article 16 of the SADC Treaty 1992. 
375 http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/sadc-institutions/tribun/ ( accessed 18 June 2017) 
376 http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/sadc-institutions/tribun/ (accessed 18 June 2017); The plaintiffs in the case 
of Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe [2008] SADCT 2 (28 November 2008), all won 
cases against the Zimbabwean government in the Tribunal.  This case involved the expropriation of private land 
without compensation, the Zimbabwe government was found to be in breach of Article 4 and Article 6 of the 
SADC Treaty 1992. However the government refused to implement the Tribunal’s orders against it and 
persuaded SADC leaders, not only to stop the Tribunal accepting new cases and holding hearings [in August 
2010], but also to stop appointing judges to keep the Tribunal operational [in May 2011].  This paralysed, but 
did not legally abolish, the Tribunal. 
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Maputo, Mozambique, the SADC Summit addressed the issue of the 
suspended SADC Tribunal. The SADC Summit resolved that a new Tribunal 
should be negotiated and that its mandate should be confined to 
interpretation of the SADC Treaty and Protocols relating to disputes between 
member States.377 
The new Protocol makes provision for the repeal of the original Protocol, to 
become effective when the new Protocol itself comes into operation. The 
protocol requires two thirds ratification, to date only nine members had 
signed at the 34th SDAC Summit held in Victoria Falls Zimbabwe. Meanwhile, 
as has been the case for the last four years and on paper only, the original 
Protocol continues in force and the SADC Tribunal continues to exist, by 
virtue of the SADC Treaty of 1992.378 Nonetheless it is a phantom court 
without judges, and unlikely to become operational in the near future.379 
 
The previous protocol gave the tribunal wide-ranging jurisdiction. While the 
new Protocol seriously curtails this jurisdiction. It states simply that the 
Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to interpret the SADC Treaty and protocols 
relating to disputes between member states. This effectively limits the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal to state to state disputes only.380 Erasmus states 
that this resultantly leaves the issues ambiguous, by failing to clarify on the 
technicalities.381 ISDS is removed from the scope of the Tribunal which causes 
a regression in the development of the investment dispute settlement regime 
in Africa. Investors are essentially left at the mercy of their own states to 
espouse their claims; this is unlikely to happen given the politics involved. 
SADC has taken their own route diverging from all the other regional 
instruments including the PAIC. 
                                                          
377 http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/sadc-institutions/tribun/ (accessed 18 June 2017). 
378See http://www.veritaszim.net/node/1151(accessed 18 June 2017). 
379 See http://www.veritaszim.net/node/1151(accessed 18 June 2017). 
380 Article 33 of the Protocol on the SADC Tribunal. 
381Erasmus G The new protocol for the SADC Tribunal: Jurisdictional Changes and Implications for the SADC 
Community Law Stellenbosch Tralac 7. 
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Article 44 deals with enforcement and execution of decisions which already is 
a highly contentious issue given the history of SADC. It is stated that all 
decisions are binding and that states should comply.382 Failure to comply 
means that matter may be referred back to the tribunal, and only if the 
tribunal establishes the existence of failure will the matter be referred to the 
Summit for an appropriate action.383 This is weak and ineffectual compliance 
which may result in similar issues of compliance as the last tribunal faced.384 
The Summit which consists of the very states involved in a dispute will have 
to decide on an action. This is worrying as Summit decisions are taken by 
consensus making it possible for the recalcitrant member to veto proposals to 
implement tribunal decisions as Zimbabwe did in the Campbell matter.385 
 
The new protocol seems to abolish the compulsory jurisdiction over all 
member states by giving them an option to withdraw from the protocol.386 This 
makes it inconsistent with the SADC Treaty as the Tribunal is one of the 
fundamental organs.387 It would also remove dispute resolution of investment 
disputes for countries that would have withdrawn, leaving them no recourse. 
 
SADC purports to be a rules based system, yet they have failed to follow 
procedure in dismantling the Tribunal and bringing about a new one. They 
have out rightly disrespected the rights of SADC citizens.388 The new protocol 
is fraught with inconsistencies. The lack of transitional arrangements creates 
uncertainty and questions the functionality of SADC.389 
                                                          
382 Article 44(1) of the Protocol on the SADC Tribunal. 
383 Article 44(2) of the Protocol on the SADC Tribunal. 
384 Erasmus G The new protocol for the SADC Tribunal: Jurisdictional Changes and Implications for the SADC 
Community Law Stellenbosch Tralac 10 
385Erasmus G The new protocol for the SADC Tribunal: Jurisdictional Changes and Implications for the SADC 
Community Law Stellenbosch Tralac 10. 
386 Article 50 of the Protocol on the SADC Tribunal. 
387 Article 9 of the SADC Treaty 1992. 
388 Erasmus G The new protocol for the SADC Tribunal: Jurisdictional Changes and Implications for the SADC 
Community Law Stellenbosch Tralac 7. 
389 Erasmus G The new protocol for the SADC Tribunal: Jurisdictional Changes and Implications for the SADC 
Community Law Stellenbosch Tralac 7. 
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The SADC Tribunal has caused a serious indictment of dispute settlement on 
the African continent. The failure of the Tribunal stemming from the Campbell 
matter and the eventual dismantling of the tribunal is a cause for concern. 
The fact that the SADC FIP directs all disputes to this defunct non-existent 
body is disconcerting and will not achieve much in the way of investor 
confidence. This fails to solve the current issues faced in the investment 
dispute system. Instead of attempting to harmonise the region’s laws like the 
EAC, each member state will continue signing BITs thereby exacerbating the 
continent’s integration. A welcome approach would be directing investment 
disputes to existing tribunals on the continent. 
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4.3. CURRENT TRENDS IN INVESTMENT DISPUTES IN AFRICA 
 
As stated in Chapter 2, Africa is home to multiple arbitration institutes. 
However, despite there being individuals with the relevant knowledge, skill 
and experience on international dispute resolution and competent 
institutions, which specialize in, or are devoted to facilitating international 
arbitration. The majority of international arbitrations has traditionally been 
administered by a handful of arbitral institutions based primarily in Europe, 
including, most notably, the International Chamber of Commerce and the 
London Court of International Arbitration. Other prominent regional arbitral 
institutions include the Singapore International Arbitration Centre and Hong 
Kong International Arbitration in Asia and the American Arbitration 
Association’s International Centre for Dispute Resolution in North America.390 
With the possible exception of the CRCICA, Africa has in the past been without 
a prominent, home grown arbitral institution. There has been a general 
tendency by parties to a dispute doing business in Africa to go back to their 
home turfs to appoint arbitrators.391 Most disputants prefer to appoint their 
non-nationals as arbitrators in international disputes, thus resulting in 
instances where even some Africans select non-Africans to be arbitrators.392 
Indeed, it has been observed that the near absence of African arbitrators in 
ICSID arbitration proceedings can in part be explained by the fact that African 
states predominantly appoint international lawyers to represent their 
interests.393A good example is the Kigali International Arbitration Centre 
(KIAC) where the panel of arbitrators mainly consists of non-Africans.394 The 
above scenario thus raises the issue of bias. It has been observed that parties 
to disputes rarely select African cities as venues for international arbitration, 
                                                          
390 Muigua K, ‘Reawakening Arbitral Institutions for Development of Arbitration in Africa’ 23. 
391Muigua K, ‘Reawakening Arbitral Institutions for Development of Arbitration in Africa’ 23. 
392 Muigua K, ‘Reawakening Arbitral Institutions for Development of Arbitration in Africa’ 23; http://www.gtlaw-
doingbusinessinafrica.com/2014/08/the-emergence-of-arbitral-institutions-in-africa/ (accessed 27 June 2017). 
393 Lew J, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, (2003) 237. 
394http://www.kiac.org.rw/IMG/pdf/final_panel_of_international_arbitrators_2017_.pdf (accessed 17 June 
2017); Only 22 of the 62 arbitrators are African. 
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and this is so even for some international arbitral institutions or arbitrators, 
when asked to make the choice.395 
An interesting dynamic that has added significantly to the field of 
international arbitration in Africa is the China Africa relations.396 China is 
now a significant investor on the continent.397 This has led to the 
establishment of a new international arbitration centre to resolve commercial 
disputes between Chinese and African parties in Johannesburg South 
Africa.398 The China Africa Joint Arbitration Centre will provide an alternative 
to the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, 
which will likely be a welcome development for African parties who may be 
sceptical of holding arbitrations outside the continent.399 The introduction of 
an investment dispute settlement system on the African continent has to start 
with capacitation of the existing institutional arbitration facilities, like the 
CRICA and KIAC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
395 LexisNexis and Mayer Brown International LLP, “Arbitration in sub-Saharan Africa,” p.1. Available at 
http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/News/937b1c45-31e5-437f-
bbe339e5f01dd1d/Presentation/NewsAttachment/6fb0a0bf-0164-
4c30a54d63eccc1dd65f/LexisNexis_2012_arbitration-in-sub-aharan-Africa.pdf     
396 Kidane W ‘The China Africa factor’ University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law Vol 35 Issue 3, 2015 
110. 
397 China’s FDI stock in the region increased almost threefold between 2010 and 2015. UNCTAD’s World 
Investment Report at 47. 
398 http://www.cietac-sh.org/CAJAC/arbitrate_informations_detail_E.aspx?id=153 (accessed 27 June 2017).  
399 Snider TR ‘China Africa Joint Arbitration Centre Established in Johannesburg’ September 18, 2015 available 
at http://www.gtlaw-doingbusinessinafrica.com/2015/09/china-africa-joint-arbitration-centre-established-in-
johannesburg/ (accessed 27 June 2017). 
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4.4. CONCLUSION 
 
The current IIA regime is known for its complexity and incoherence, gaps and 
overlaps. Rising regionalism in international investment policymaking 
presents a rare opportunity to rationalize the regime and create a more 
coherent, manageable and development-oriented set of investment policies.400 
In reality, however, regionalism is moving in the opposite direction, effectively 
leading to a multiplication of treaty layers, making the network of 
international investment obligations even more complex and prone to overlap 
and inconsistency.401 
 
 
The chronology of agreements suggests that regional groupings have more 
harmonisation than the larger conglomeration of blocs; the SADC FIP was 
signed and ratified long after the COMESA CCIA which is still to come into 
effect. These initiatives express the determination of African countries to 
embark on IIA reform in order to make the policy framework for investment 
in Africa more balanced and more oriented to sustainable development.402 
However, they risk overlapping with one another, potentially diluting the 
impact of regional reform efforts and creating a more complex regime instead 
of harmonizing and consolidating it. It is therefore crucial to synchronize 
reform efforts at different levels of policymaking continental, regional and 
national. This requires coordination and cooperation among African countries 
in order to avoid overlap, policy inconsistencies and fragmentation403 
                                                          
400 UNCTAD ‘S World Investment Report 2017 130 (accessed 27 June 2017). 
401UNCTAD ‘S World Investment Report 2017 130 (accessed 27 June 2017). 
402 UNCTAD ‘S World Investment Report 2017 130 (accessed 27 June 2017). 
403 UNCTAD ‘S World Investment Report 2017 130 (accessed 27 June 2017). 
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The review of surveys taken of investors has confirmed that investors want a 
predictable investment climate. The predictability of the investment climate 
may be enhanced if domestic policies are incorporated into regional 
treaties.404It seems in the process of integration most of the improvements at 
sub regional levels have been lost and what results is a watered down code 
which will in essence have no effect on the existing spaghetti bowl of IIAs. 
 
The CCIA is a significant example of what African states see as the proper 
approach to investment agreements. In this it should act as a counter-
example to the developed country dominated models of IIAs and to offer a new 
departure for analysis of how future IIAs should be structured.405 However its 
lack of implementation remains a huge African problem. The CCIA even 
presents the system with a tribunal to handle disputes. There is no political 
will to strengthen intra-African investment which these RTAs cover. The 
parallel existence of prior BITs and the more recent regional trade agreements 
with investment provisions has systemic implications and poses a number of 
legal and policy questions. These include questions on how to deal with 
possible inconsistencies between the treaties.406 Parallelism is also at the 
heart of systemic problems of overlap, inconsistency and the concomitant lack 
of transparency and predictability arising from a multi-faceted, multi-layered 
IIA regime. It adds yet another layer of obligations and further complicates 
countries’ ability to navigate the complex spaghetti bowl of treaties and to 
pursue a coherent, focused IIA strategy.407  
 
                                                          
404 COMESA Investment Report, 2012 36. 
405Muchlinski, P, The COMESA Common Investment Area: Substantive Standards and Procedural Problems in 
Dispute Settlement (2008). SOAS School of Law Research Paper No. 11/2010 33. 
406 The COMESA investment agreement, for example, states in Article 32.3: “In the event of inconsistency 
between this Agreement and such other agreements between Member States mentioned in paragraph 2 of this 
Article, this agreement shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency, except as otherwise provided in this 
Agreement. 
407 UNCTAD ‘S World Investment Report 2017 130 (accessed 27 June 2017). 
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Although parallelism appears to be the prevalent approach, current regional 
IIA negotiations nevertheless present a window of opportunity to consolidate 
the existing network of BITs. The extent to which parties opt to replace several 
existing BITs with an investment chapter in one regional agreement could 
help consolidate the IIA network.408 The only problem is that despite having 
all these regional investment agreements, investor state disputes against 
African states are mostly instituted by non-African investors. No matter how 
comprehensive the regional agreements there may be they still do not cover 
investors that come from outside the continent. The most prevalent problem 
is also that these regional investment agreements do not offer dispute 
settlement within the continent. With the exception of CCIA and the SADC 
FIP which rejects ISDS altogether, investors are given the option to choose 
which international forum they would institute their claim in, which is no 
different from the current BITs. There is a need for more harmonisation not 
only in principle but even when negotiating IIAs. Investment agreements 
should be negotiated by the regional groupings so that there can be more 
harmonisation. It is at this juncture that states can negotiate the dispute 
settlement system to be applied.  
The PAIC presents a unique opportunity to harmonise investment 
instruments within the region. More so when it is set to be the investment 
chapter of the CFTA. Although the PAIC does not present a wholesome 
investment agreement, there is still room for improvement. Aspects from the 
CCIA can be incorporated into the PAIC, such as transparency and most 
importantly the function of the tribunal as an investment dispute settlement 
system. There is much that can be gleaned from regional investment 
agreements to be implemented on a continental level. However, this can only 
be done alongside reform in the AU to allow for seamless regional integration 
and creation of new institutions. 
                                                          
408 UNCTAD ‘S World Investment Report 2017 130 (accessed 27 June 2017). 
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Currently the African continent does not offer much in the form of investment 
dispute settlement. Except for a few arbitral centres which seem to lack the 
institutional capacity and as a result fail to boost investor confidence. 
Investment dispute settlement remains outside of the African continent, with 
even African governments opting for international legal counsel and selecting 
international arbitrators from the international tribunal panels. 
 
There is a need to employ mechanisms that will help awaken arbitral 
institutions in Africa and demonstrate the continent to the outside world as a 
place with international arbitrators with sufficient knowledge and expertise to 
be appointed to arbitrate international matters.409 The current myriad of 
regional investment agreements does not offer any concrete solutions to the 
issues faced by African countries in investment dispute settlement. The CFTA 
through its investment chapter presents a rare opportunity for the continent 
to establish its own investment tribunal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
409  Muigua K, ‘Reawakening Arbitral Institutions for Development of Arbitration in Africa’ 23. 
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5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The main question to be answered in this research is whether the current 
foreign investment dispute settlement system is legitimate enough to address 
the developmental issues faced by African countries. It has been established 
that the current investment dispute settlement system was largely accepted 
by African countries under the belief that a stable system would attract 
foreign direct investment.410 It has now become apparent as the investment 
dispute settlement system faces scrutiny that it fails to address the unique 
issues faced by African governments which are often found on the receiving 
end of huge damages claims. This is the final chapter of this mini-thesis. It 
presents a summary of the outcomes and the proposed recommendations 
 
5.2. SUMMARY OF OUTCOMES 
 
A comprehensive study of the current international investment dispute 
settlement regime has been done and it has been found wanting. African 
nations have grouped together in their blocs and have now started to come 
up with their own investment policies that address their specific needs. It has 
been noted that instruments like the CCIA and the PAIC include clauses 
which allow for developmental issues to be addressed. However, there is a 
need to harmonise investment policies across Africa as contradictions and 
overlaps are bound to follow. For example, the SADC FIP removes ISDS 
completely yet most SADC member states are also COMESA members and the 
                                                          
410Mann H ‘Reconceptualising international investment law: its role in sustainable development’ Lewis & 
Clarke Law Review Vol 17 (2013) 534. 
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CCIA provides for ISDS. The rise of regionalism in international investment 
relations may create a new momentum for COMESA countries to engage in 
regional dialogue on investment policies for development to find consensus on 
how to best ensure coherence between regional and bilateral investment 
agreements. This could lead COMESA countries to reconsider the relationship 
between BITs signed by individual COMESA countries and regional 
investment agreements such as the CCIA and the ongoing negotiations for a 
COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area. These agreements provide 
an opportunity for COMESA members to phase out older BITs that no longer 
reflect the sustainable development priorities of COMESA countries. Also as 
many BITs signed by COMESA countries in the late 1990s are reaching their 
expiry date, countries have an opportunity to revisit their content and 
incorporate provisions that reflect the latest trends in international 
investment law.411 The legal basis of the current investment dispute 
settlement regime is very multiplex, while many of the other international law 
dispute settlement mechanisms are anchored in well-defined treaty 
frameworks, investment disputes are not. 
 After careful study it was noted that while the African continent has 
comprehensive investment policies. The lack of political will to implement the 
policies has resulted in leaving the investment dispute settlement system on 
the continent deficient. The EAC guide and the PAIC offer investors the normal 
BIT dispute settlement options which include ICSID and ad hoc arbitration 
under UNCITRAL rules. This is in spite of the fact that Africa offers a host of 
arbitral institutions and well qualified arbitrators, such as the KIAC. There is 
no inclination on the part of investors foreign and local to have their disputes 
settled within the continent and also before African arbitrators. This is largely 
because investors fear bias and influence from host governments over the 
process.  
 
                                                          
411 COMESA Investment Report 2013. 
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The TFTA which is set to begin the second phase of negotiations which include 
investment presents the sub-region a chance to harmonise their investment 
policies and to have a binding instrument. There seems to be unwillingness 
by African leaders to implement or be bound by instruments that promote 
intra-African investment, for example the CCIA remains unratified. As the 
TFTA is the trailblazer for the CFTA, within which the PAIC may be included 
as an investment chapter, this presents the continent with an opportunity to 
also include a regional investment court, similar to the tribunal set up by the 
CETA Agreement. 
 
The call for reform in the investment dispute settlement system has largely 
been about the far-reaching implications of investor state dispute 
settlement.412 This is the main issue amongst a myriad of issues. There are 
also issues to do with the contradictions between arbitral awards leading to 
inconsistent interpretation of investment protection standards and 
unpredictability of decisions.413 The independence and impartiality of 
arbitrators and the costs and time of arbitral proceedings have also been 
raised as issues.414 It is evident that the continent faces its own set of issues 
over and above the ones in the investment dispute settlement. It is clear that 
the current investment dispute settlement system is flawed and fails to 
address issues faced by governments. This is even more so in the case of 
African governments that face a unique set of challenges. These challenges 
include attempting to balance the flow of FDI and developmental needs in a 
country. As stated in Chapter 3 there are many issues that need to be taken 
into account when addressing issues in investment dispute settlement for 
African nations. They suffer untenable bias at the hands of arbitrators, of 
                                                          
412 Carim X ‘International investment agreements and Africa’s structural transformation: A perspective from 
South Africa’ South Centre Investment Policy Brief, Issue No 4 (August 2015) 5. 
413 Sornarajah M’ The International Law on Foreign Investment’ 3ed (2010) 320. 
414 Köppen A & d’Aspremont J, Global Reform vs Regional Emancipation: The Principles on International 
Investment for Sustainable Development in Africa, 6:2 ESIL Reflection. 
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which tribunals are made up mostly of European and American white males. 
For an investment court system to work for African nations it must be a 
solution that addresses the concerns facing these states. 
5.3. RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
The establishment of a regional investment court on the African continent 
would be ideal given the opportunities in the TFTA and the CFTA which are 
yet to negotiate the investment chapters. The tribunal established by CETA 
can serve as a prime example of how a regional court can be established and 
housed in the framework of the CFTA.415 The CFTA can include an African 
Regional investment dispute settlement system housed within the CFTA. 
However, the process would have to be gradual. 
 
The introduction of an investment dispute settlement system on the African 
continent has to start with capacitation of the existing institutional arbitration 
facilities, like the CRICA and KIAC. The TFTA can introduce dispute 
settlement with the option to have the disputes settled at these institutions 
under the UNCITRAL rules. Despite the fact that these centres offer mostly 
commercial arbitration, capacity can only be built with exposure to 
investment issues the same way the LCIA developed. 
 
This investment dispute settlement system would be complemented by the 
establishment of an investment court system (ICS) in the CFTA. The PAIC as 
the instrument likely to be adopted as the CFTA investment chapter would 
house the ICS. CETA introduces a new ICS. The ICS will consist of a 
permanent and an appellate tribunal, which is a novelty in investment dispute 
settlement. Similarly, the CFTA can include the establishment of a tribunal 
                                                          
415 European Commission- A future multilateral investment court, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-16-4350_en.htm (accessed 20 December 2016). 
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that deals with investment matters. The tribunal will abide by strict rules 
regarding ethics to ensure that the members of the tribunal are impartial and 
independent. After the failure of the SADC Tribunal it is imperative that 
appointment of judges is done strictly and also to ensure the enforcement of 
decisions it should remain apolitical.  
 
The task of the tribunal will be to hear claims of violation of the investment 
protection standards. The CFTA would like CETA not allow for parallel 
proceedings. This would make it impossible to try a case before the ICS and 
a national court or any other regional courts at the same time. This would 
solve the issue of overlapping jurisdiction. Once the ICS tribunal has rendered 
a decision, the decision must be final, and it cannot later be changed by the 
AU Commission. This would ensure enforcement and that member states 
would not be able to interfere, like the SADC Tribunal decision which caused 
the Tribunal to shut down. CETA has adopted the loser-pays system; the 
losing party will therefore be obliged to bear the costs of the winning party in 
an ICS case. This could also be adopted by the CFTA ICS to ensure that only 
genuine claims are brought and that frivolous suits would be penalised.  
 
The idea is to establish a permanent body to decide investment disputes, with 
consideration of the development needs faced by African nations, moving 
away from the ad hoc system of ISDS. This multilateral investment court 
would adjudicate disputes under future and existing investment treaties. For 
the AU, it would replace ICSID and ad hoc arbitration included in the regional 
investment agreements. 
 
While some commentators have suggested that a new court and appellate 
mechanism may simply lead to increased delays and costs before an aggrieved 
investor secures a suitable remedy for a breach of a treaty, in reality it could 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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do the opposite.416 The new procedures could save time and costs. The ICS 
could provide a timeline for the Tribunal to render a final award after a claim 
has been submitted. Given the inefficiencies and delays faced at the African 
Court of Human rights, it is imperative that strict adherence to timelines is 
monitored and that reasons must be given by the Tribunal to the disputing 
parties for any extensions of time beyond the timeline. The new system could 
also facilitate enforcement of a favourable decision. Although acceptance of 
this system by host states may at first be problematic, it is expected that the 
CFTA will be ratified by most African states and the ICS can be contained 
therein. 
 
All in all, Africa could benefit from having its own investment dispute 
settlement system. An ICS would address most of the issues faced in 
investment dispute settlement currently, with an appellate mechanism to 
ensure consistency. The ICS would also be sensitive to the unique issues faced 
by African countries. The continent would benefit greatly as the parties would 
also be more inclined to use counsel from within the region as opposed to the 
current system which propagates for poor governments to engage 
international counsel which cost more than their GDP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
416 European Commission- A future multilateral investment court, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-16-4350_en.htm (accessed 20 December 2016). 
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